How Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It? by Weintraub, Russell J.
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 24 | Issue 1 Article 9
9-1-1998
How Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments-
Recognition Convention and What Should We
Bargain Away to Get It?
Russell J. Weintraub
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?,
24 Brook. J. Int'l L. (1998).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol24/iss1/9
HOW SUBSTANTIAL IS OUR NEED FOR A
JUDGMENTS-RECOGNITION
CONVENTION AND WHAT SHOULD WE
BARGAIN AWAY TO GET ITV
Russell J. Weintraub*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992 the United States proposed that the Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law' "undertake work on a
convention dealing with the recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments."2 A Special Commission impaneled to study
the proposal concluded that a judgments convention would be
"advantageous,"3 and work on a judgments convention is pro-
ceeding.
The reason for the U.S. proposal is that, with the excep-
tion of specialized tax treaties4 and the occasional operation of
t Copyright © 1998 by Russell J. Weintraub.
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prudence, University of Texas School of Law; J.D. Harvard Law School; B.A. New
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1. The Hague Conference on Private International Law is an organization of
38 member countries focusing on the drafting of multilateral conventions covering
choice of law and procedural problems of international litigation. The Conference
first met in 1893 and was joined by the United States in 1964. See Peter H.
Pfund, The Hague Conference Celebrates Its 100th Anniversary, 28 TEL INTL L.J.
531, 532-33 (1993). The United States has ratified four of the Hague Conventions
dealing with service abroad, taking evidence abroad, abolishing the requirement for
legalization of foreign public documents, and international child abduction. See id.
2. Permanent Bureau, Conclusions of the Working Group Meeting on Enforce-
ment of Judgments, in HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 29, 1993, Tome I, 17 H.C.P.I.L.
PROC. 257 (1995) [hereinafter Working Group Conclusions]. The proposal was con-
tained in a letter of May 5, 1992 from the Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department
of State to the Secretary General of the Hague Conference. See Arthur von
Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for
the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 282 (1994).
3. CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JuDG-
1IENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATrEES 12 (Hague Conference on Private Int'l
Law, Prel. Doc. No. 7, 1997) [hereinafter KESSEDJIAN REPORT].
4. See Alan R. Johnson et al., Reciprocal Enforcement of Tax Claims Through
Tax Treaties, 33 TAX LAW. 469, 473-74 (1979) (discussing "general enforcement"
and "limited enforcement" treaties); id. at 475-76 (discussing limited enforcement
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a friendship, commerce, and navigation treaty,5 the United
States is not a party to any convention that requires recogni-
tion of judgments. Most U.S. jurisdictions recognize and en-
force the judgments of other countries,6 but there is a percep-
tion that this favor is not reciprocated abroad.! In addition, a
multilateral convention ratified by the United States and the
members of the European Union (EU) would free the United
States from the specter of judgments rendered by EU countries
but founded on exorbitant bases for personal jurisdiction.8
Except for regional conventions such as the Brussels Con-
vention' and the Inter-American Convention, ° past attempts
at judgments conventions have ended in failure. For several
years the United States and United Kingdom negotiated a
treaties designed to prevent abuse of treaties limiting double taxation); id. at 484
(discussing mechanics of enforcement and desirability of a determination of liability
by judgment in the taxing nation).
5. See Choi v. Kim, 50 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that "[t]he Trea-
ty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of America
and The Republic of Korea, 8 U.S.T. 2217, elevates a Korean judgment to the
status of a sister state judgment"); Vagenas v. Continental Gin Co., 988 F.2d 104,
106-07 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that the treaty between the United States and
Greece, which guarantees to the citizens of each country the same access to the
courts of the other country as the citizens of that country, precludes Alabama from
applying a shorter statute of limitations to recognition of a Greek judgment than
would be applied to a sister-state judgment).
6. See discussion infra Part II.B.
7. See discussion infra Part IIA.
8. See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L.299) 32 [hereinafter Brus-
sels Convention] (for the consolidated, current text of this convention see 1990 O.J.
(C 189) 1, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1413). See especially Article 3 (listing exorbitant
bases for jurisdiction utilized by the European Union (EU) countries); Article 4
(providing that these exorbitant bases may be used against defendants not domi-
ciled in the E.U.); Article 28 (requiring recognition of judgments of other E.U.
countries even if an exorbitant basis for jurisdiction has been used); Article 59
(permitting E.U. countries to bind themselves by convention with a non-E.U. coun-
try not to recognize E.U. judgments when exorbitant bases for jurisdiction are
used).
9. Brussels Convention, supra note 8. The Lugano Convention mirrors the
Brussels Convention and is ratified by the E.U. countries and the non-E.U. mem-
bers of the European Free Trade Association. See Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988,
1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (commonly referred to as the
Lugano Convention).
10. Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for
the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments, May 24, 1984, OAS Treaty Ser.
No. A/39, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 468 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]. The
United States has not ratified this convention.
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judgments convention, and in 1976 the negotiators initialed an
ad referendum text." This text was subsequently amended to
permit refusal to enforce judgments in excess of an amount
considered proper in the recognizing country.' Despite this
amendment, the attempt foundered because U.K. manufactur-
ers and insurers feared huge U.S. jury awards."3 A previous
Hague Conference project produced a judgments convention, 4
but it was ratified by only three countries and has not entered
into force even between these three because additional bilat-
eral agreements, required by the convention, have not been
concluded.'5
Thus, based on past experience, the prospects for a multi-
lateral judgments convention that will meet the needs of the
United States are not bright. We are blessed with represen-
tatives of U.S. interests who are willing to contribute their
formidable knowledge and skill to the endeavor. 6 The ques-
tions that press upon our negotiators are what sort of conven-
tion can they realistically work toward and what concessions of
U.S. interests are appropriate to facilitate a successful con-
clusion.
Part II of this Article explores in more detail the need for
a convention. Part III surveys the possible forms for a conven-
tion. Part IV focuses on why U.S. Supreme Court decisions
have created difficulties for our negotiators in reaching agree-
ment on proper bases for personal jurisdiction. Part V discuss-
11. Draft Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil Matters, initialed Oct. 26, 1976, U.K-U.S., reprinted in 16 I.L.M.
71.
12. See von Mehren, supra note 2, at 274 (quoting Article 8A added in 1978).
For the wording of 8A, see text accompanying note 225.
13. See von Mehren, supra note 2, at 274.
14. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters and Supplementary Protocol, done Feb. 1, 1971,
1144 U.N.T.S. 249.
15. See von Mehren, supra note 2, at 275 n.17.
16. The U.S. delegates to the first meeting of the Hague Conference's Special
Commission on Judgments in June 1997 were Professor Arthur T. von Mehren,
Harvard Law School; Professor Ronald A. Brand, University of Pittsburgh School
of Law; Peter D. Trooboff, of Covington and Burling, Washington, D.C.; David
Epstein, Director, Office of Foreign Litigation, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice; Peter H. Pfund, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law,
U.S. Department of State; Sean D. Murphy, Legal Counselor, American Embassy
the Hague. See Memorandum from Peter H. Pfund to the Author and Others (May
27, 1997) (on file with author).
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es what matters other than jurisdiction the convention might
cover. Part VI concludes that the odds for success are not good,
but that the exercise will, in any event, be useful if it does
nothing but cause us to rethink those aspects of our legal insti-
tution that have created concern abroad.
II. THE NEED FOR A CONVENTION
A. Current Data Is Needed
The conventional wisdom driving the U.S. initiative for a
judgments convention is that American states freely recognize
and enforce foreign judgments,' but that other countries do
not accord reciprocal treatment to U.S. judgments." A mem-
ber of the Study Group advising the Department of State on
negotiations for the judgments convention, however, states
that "the little empirical research conducted to date by the
author and others has not demonstrated a great need for a
convention." 9 Up-to-date empirically verified information on
the current treatment of U.S. judgments abroad20 would
greatly assist our negotiators. It is also useful to know to what
extent difficulties encountered are the fault of the U.S. attor-
ney who has blundered by not serving process on the foreign
party in a manner that courts of other countries will counte-
nance.21 In 1988, Professor Juenger conducted a survey of the
17. See Joseph J. Simeone, The Recognition and Enforceability of Foreign
Country Judgments, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 341, 357 (1993) (stating that "the mod-
em trend in the courts of the United States is to grant recognition of, and conclu-
sive effect to, the foreign judgment if all the elements of due process and civilized
procedures are followed").
18. See Matthew H. Adler, If We Build It, Will They Come?-The Need for a
Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary
Judgments, 26 LAW & POL'Y INTL BUS. 79, 81 (1994) (stating that "the consensus"
in academic circles and in the U.S. Department of State "is that individuals seek-
ing enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad have not had the same good fortune as
foreign litigants seeking enforcement in the United States").
19. Id. at 80.
20. See id. at 82 (stating that "[t]here is no catalogue of the actual experi-
ences of U.S. litigants seeking enforcement abroad").
21. See id. at 95 (stating that Korea, Japan, Mexico, Panama, Portugal, South
Africa, Spain, Taiwan, and Venezuela "impose service of process procedures that
are not common in the United States" and will not enforce a U.S. judgment if the
defendant was not served according to these procedures); Ryan G. Anderson,
Transnational Litigation Involving Mexican Parties, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1059, 1111
(1994) (stating that whether a Mexican court will recognize a U.S. judgment de-
pends, in part, on the method used to serve process on the Mexican defendant).
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treatment of U.S. judgments abroad and found the situation
"far from satisfactory,"22 but much has changed since then.'
With modern methods of instant communication of manu-
scripts, a reliable update by foreign experts should be feasible
within a reasonably short time.' In addition, the resources of
the U.S. government and national and local bar associations
should expeditiously be able to compile a catalogue of experi-
ences of a large sample of attorneys who have sought recogni-
tion abroad of a U.S. judgment.
Current reliable data on the reception of U.S. judgments
abroad may be a two-edged sword. If, as I suspect, judgments
obtained by U.S. lawyers who follow proper procedures are
readily recognized and enforced abroad, there is little need for
a convention, but one should be easier to obtain with minimum
concession of U.S. interests, such as giving foreign courts the
right to pare down "excessive" judgmentsY If there are grave
difficulties in obtaining recognition for U.S. judgments abroad,
there is more need for a convention, but one will be more diffi-
cult to obtain without concessions that many Americans will
find unpalatable. If the situation is generally favorable to the
treatment of U.S. judgments but there are a few important
22. Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. COmP. L. 1, 4 (1988).
23. See, e.g., Alan Lescht, Hunting the Elusive Money Judgment, LEGAL TIMES,
Oct. 23, 1995, at 35, 36 (stating that "generally speaking, foreign courts will recog-
nize and enforce U.S. money judgments provided that the plaintiff is able to dem-
onstrate" that the defendant has been accorded a fair hearing in a court properly
exercising jurisdiction, that judgment is final, is not contrary to public policy, and
that the U.S. jurisdiction rendering the judgment would accord reciprocal recogni-
tion to the foreign courts' judgments); Giovanni M. Marini et al., Recognition of
Foreign Judgments, INT'L COM. LITIG., Feb. 1996, at 25 (reporting on change in
Italian law making it "easier to have a foreign judgment recognized and enforced
in Italy-).
24. The update should be assisted by Professor Lutz's bibliography of codes,
conventions, and publications, though most of the publications are more than ten
years old. See Robert E. Lutz, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Part II: A Se-
lected Bibliography on Enforcement of U.S. Judgments in Foreign Countries, 27
INT'L LAW. 1029 (1993).
25. This was the effect of the amendment to the ad referendum text of the
U.K.-U.S. draft Judgments Convention in a fruitless effort to obtain U.K. approval.
See von Mehren, supra note 2, at 274 (giving courts in the recognizing country the
right to "recognize and enforce the judgment in a lesser amount" if the "amount
awarded by the court of origin is greatly in excess of the amount" that would
have been awarded in the recognizing country). For the full text of the amend-
ment, see infra text accompanying note 225.
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black holes, U.S. lawyers can advise their clients accordingly
and utilize arbitration agreements and other devices, such as
letters of credit,26 to avoid having to rely on a U.S. judgment
that will disappear abroad without a trace. The United States
has ratified the New York27 and Panama 28 Arbitration Con-
ventions, which require enforcement of awards.29 Most of the
world's major commercial powers have also ratified the New
York Arbitration Convention. 0
The United States does not need a judgments convention
to curtail use of exorbitant bases of jurisdiction in E.U. coun-
tries.3 ' There is no evidence that these bases are being used
against U.S. defendants, 2 and German courts have reined in
one of the most notorious bases, general jurisdiction over the
owner of real or personal property located in Germany.33
26. A letter of credit provides a method of guaranteeing payment of an in-
debtedness. See U.C.C. § 5-108 (requiring the issuer of a letter of credit to pay a
draft accompanied by the documents listed in the letter).
27. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force
with respect to the United States Dec. 29, 1970) [hereinafter New York Arbitration
Convention].
28. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,
opened for signature Jan. 30, 1975, 104 Stat. 448, O.S.T.S. No. 42 [hereinafter
Panama Convention].
29. See New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 27, art. III (requiring
recognition and enforcement); id. art. V (limiting grounds on which recognition and
enforcement may be refused); Panama Convention, supra note 28, art. 4 (requiring
recognition and execution), id. art. 5 (limiting grounds on which recognition and
execution may be refused).
30. As of January 1, 1997, 106 countries have ratified the New York Arbitra-
tion Convention and 16 countries have ratified the Panama Convention. See 9
U.S.CA.. §§ 201, 301 (Supp. 1997) (notes following these sections).
31. See supra text accompanying note 8.
32. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in
the European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1212 (1984)
(stating that "there is no indication in reported decisions to suggest that the Brus-
sels Conventions jurisdictional discrimination has posed much of a practical prob-
lem"); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a Multilateral Judgments Convention:
A Reaction to the von Mehren Report, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 271, 303 (1994)
(stating that a convention is not needed to protect against EU enforcement of
judgments based on exorbitant jurisdiction because "[wie have seen no such cases
in the twenty years since the Brussels Convention entered into effect, and it is
unlikely that we will see such cases--or at any rate many such cases-in the
future").
33. See Judgment of July 2, 1991, BGH, 1991 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
[NJW] 3092 (requiring that in addition to the location of assets, there must be a
sufficient connection between the litigation and Germany); Judgment of Oct. 7,
1992, OLG Milnchen, 1993 Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 66 (affirm-
172
19981 HOW SUBSTANTIAL IS OUR NEED? 173
We do not know how much the United States needs a
judgments-recognition convention and until we do, we do not
know how many chips to bargain away in order to obtain one.
B. U.S. Recognition of Foreign Judgments
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion does not apply to judgments of other countries.35 The
law of each state controls recognition of foreign judgments in
that state." Federal courts in diversity" and alienage8 cas-
es apply the law of the state in which they sit 9 concerning
recognition of foreign judgments, but apply federal law in fed-
ing dismissal of a suit by a Saudi-Arabian plaintiff against a U.S. airline, which
had assets in Germany, noting that the suit had no connection with Germany and
that Germany was not the only jurisdiction in which the plaintiff could obtain a
judgment that would be enforced in Germany).
34. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (stating that "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State").
35. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912) (stating
that the U.S. Constitution does not require full faith and credit "to the judgments
of foreign states or nations").
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. c (Rev. ed.
1989).
37. "Diversity cases" are those in which judicial power is conferred on federal
courts by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 over cases "between Citizens of different
States."
38. "Alienage cases" are those in which judicial power is conferred on federal
courts by U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 over cases "between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
39. See 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4473 at 742-744 (1981) (stating that recent federal decisions unanimously apply
the law of the state in which the federal court sits, but questioning the wisdom of
applying state standards to recognition of foreign judgments, especially in alienage
cases); cf Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law: Sources of Authority and
Sources of Rules, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1551, 1579 (1992) (stating that "assuming that
the Constitution's foreign relations or foreign trade powers, without more, could
ground uniform judge-made rules of recognition and enforcement, a showing could
not be made, at least under most of the [United States Supreme] Court's recent
federal common-law decisions, to support uniform rules as opposed to state law
borrowed as federal law except where hostile to or inconsistent with federal inter-
ests"). But cf Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments:
Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53, 79 (1984) (stating that "[a]lthough the Republic
can survive without federalizing the law of foreign judgment recognition, the argu-
ments in favor of that position are strong and the principal argument against it
amounts to little more than inertia"); Renald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign
Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International
Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 300 (1991) (stating that "[flederal legisla-
tion would seem appropriate in the recognition of foreign judgments").
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eral-question cases.4"
Except for a few states,41 U.S. courts recognize and en-
force foreign money judgments. As of January 1, 1997, twenty-
six states plus the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands
have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recogni-
tion Act (Uniform Act).42 With exceptions to protect due pro-
cess rights and otherwise assure the fairness of the proceed-
ings," the Act provides that "any foreign judgment that is
final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered"45 is
"conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or
denies recovery of a sum of money. " 4' There is a "public poli-
cy" exception,4' but it has seldom been used.48 There is no
40. See Gordon & Breach Science Publishers v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 905 F.
Supp. 169, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting claim that Swiss and German judg-
ments preclude Lanham Act claim and applying federal collateral estoppel stan-
dards); WRIGHT, supra note 39, at 741 (stating that "[in deciding federal question
cases, there is no apparent reason to consult state law and federal courts routinely
determine the res judicata effect of foreign judgments without any reference to
state law"). "Federal-question cases" are those in which U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2
confers judicial power on federal courts over cases "arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their authority."
41. See infra notes 51, 242-46 and accompanying text.
42. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 261
(1962) [hereinafter UNIFORM ACT. For a list of jurisdictions that have adopted the
Uniform Act, see the Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, at 13
U.L-A- 77 (Supp. 1997).
43. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 42, § 4(a)(1), (2), 13 U.L.A. 268 (precluding
recognition of foreign judgments in which the foreign court did not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant or when due process is otherwise violated).
44. See id. § 4(b), 13 U.L.A. 268 (permitting non-recognition if the defendant
did not .receive timely notice, the judgment was obtained by fraud, the judgment
conflicts with another judgment, the proceeding violated a forum-selection agree-
ment between the parties, or jurisdiction was based on personal service in a seri-
ously inconvenient forum).
45. Id. § 2, 13 U.L.A. 264.
46. Id. § 3, 13 U.L.A. 265.
47. Id. § 4(b)(3), 13 U.L.A. 268 (permitting non-recognition if the claim "on
which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state").
48. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Snow, 610 So. 2d 482, 487-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(refusing to recognize a wife's Canadian judgment against a Florida bail bond
company for loss of consortium when the acts of company agents who captured
and returned'her husband to face criminal charges were privileged under Florida
law but not under Canadian law); Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc.,
585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663-65 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (refusing to recognize an English libel
judgment and noting the constitutional limits that the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States has placed on libel recoveries in the United States); cf Bank Melli Iran
v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to enforce Iranian default
judgments against the sister of the former Shah because defendant could not have
obtained due process in an Iranian court). But see Tonga Air Service, Ltd. v. Fowl-
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reciprocity requirement in the Act,4 9 but six states have added
one to their versions. 0 The Colorado reciprocity provision in
effect bars recognition of foreign judgments because it limits
recognition to judgments of a country that has joined the Unit-
ed States in a judgment-recognition treaty."' There is no such
country.
The Uniform Act also precludes recognition if "the foreign
court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter."52 Pro-
fessor Juenger has cogently argued that this provision is un-
wise because the intricacies of subject-matter jurisdiction
should be thrashed out in the foreign jurisdiction."
er, 826 P.2d 204, 208, 213 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (reversing a trial court opinion
that had refused to recognize a Tongan judgment because Tongan procedure did
not provide a verbatim transcript for appeal and holding that review of a trial
court's refusal to recognize a foreign judgment under § 4 of the Uniform Act is de
novo and not for abuse of discretion). But cf Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce
v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1004 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that trial judge's refusal
to recognize Abu Dhabi judgment because of failure to meet reciprocity require-
ment of Texas act "can only be set aside upon a clear showing of abuse" of the
discretion conferred on the judge by the act and refusing to adopt exception from
dictum in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 170 (1895), that the American should be
bound by the Abu Dhabi judgment because she was the party who brought the
suit there).
49. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 42, § 4(b), 13 U.L.A. 268.
50. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-62-102(1) (West 1997) (defining "foreign
state" whose judgment would be entitled to recognition as a "governmental unit
[that] has entered into a reciprocal agreement with the United States recognizing
any judgment of a court of record of the United States"); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-
114(10) (1993) (stating that a foreign judgment "shall not be recognized if...
the party seeking to enforce the judgment fails to demonstrate that judgments of
courts of the United States and of states thereof of the same type and based on
substantially similar jurisdictional grounds are recognized and enforced in the
courts of the foreign state"); IDAHO CODE § 10-1404(2)(g) (1990) (stating that "a
foreign country judgment need not be recognized if ... judgments of this state
are not recognized in the courts of the foreign state"); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch.
235, § 23A (West 1986) (stating that a foreign judgment "shall not be recognized
if... judgments of this state are not recognized in the courts of the foreign
state"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2329.92(B) (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (stating that if
the foreign country does not have a procedure for recognizing judgments of other
countries "substantially similar" to the Uniform Act, its judgments "may be rec-
ognized and enforced . . . in the discretion of the court"); TFx. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(7) (West 1997) (stating that "[a] foreign country judgment
need not be recognized if... it is established that the foreign country in which
the judgment was rendered does not recognize judgments rendered in this state").
51. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-62-102(1) (West 1997).
52. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 42, at 268 § 4(a)(3).
53. See Juenger, supra note 22, at 18; cf. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b)(1)
(McKinney 1978) (moving lack of subject-matter jurisdiction from mandatory bases
for non-recognition to discretionary bases).
BROOK J. 1NTL L. [Vol. XXIV:I
The states that have not enacted the Uniform Act recog-
nize and enforce foreign money judgments in much the same
generous manner as in the enacting states." Section 481 of
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states:
Except as provided in § 482," a final judgment of a court of
a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of mon-
ey, establishing or confirming the status of a person, or deter-
mining interests in property, is conclusive between the par-
ties, and is entitled to recognition in courts in the United
States. 6
A comment declares that the section "sets forth the prevailing
common and statutory law of States of the United States."57
Hilton v. Guyot,5s a landmark U.S. Supreme Court opinion,
based recognition of foreign judgments on "'the comity of na-
tions.'"59 This is hardly an explanation as to why "comity"
should be granted. Perhaps the best explanation is the purely
practical one underlying the doctrine of res judica-
ta-"promoting certainty and... avoiding duplication of litiga-
54. See, e.g., Phillips USA, Inc. v. Alflex USA, Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 359 (10th
Cir. 1996) (applying Kansas law to recognize, an Australian judgment and noting
that although Kansas has not passed the Uniform Act, it applies traditional princi-
ples of comity).
55. Section 482 provides the same exceptions as the Uniform Act but moves
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction from mandatory to discretionary grounds for
non-recognition and omits jurisdiction based on service in an inconvenient forum.
See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
56. RESTATEMENT (THI 9 ) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 481(1) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].
57. Id. crat. a.
58. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
59. Id. at 163. See also id. at 202 (stating that a foreign judgment should be
recognized if there is no "special reason why the comity of this nation should not
allow it full effect"). The Court defined comity as follows:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obli-
gation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territo-
ry to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights
of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of
its laws.
Id. at 163-64. Although suit to enforce a French judgment was brought in federal
court in New York, the case was decided forty-three years before Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which held that in diversity cases federal courts
must apply the common-law rules of the state in which they sit. The Court did
not apply New York law on recognition of foreign judgments.
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tion, harassing both to the courts and the individual liti-
gants."
60
In federal-question cases, as noted above,6' federal courts
apply a federal standard to recognition of foreign judgments.
Hilton v. Guyot62 established a generous recognition standard
that is followed today:
[W]e are satisfied that, where there has been opportunity for
a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent juris-
diction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after
due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and
under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice between the citizens of its own coun-
try and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show
either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under
which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or
any other special reason why the comity of this nation should
not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in
an action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried
afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere asser-
tion of the party that the judgment was erroneous in law or
in fact.
A bare majority of the Justices in Hilton v. Guyot did establish
reciprocity as a condition to recognition of a foreign judg-
ment." It is unlikely, however, that reciprocity is any longer
part of the federal standard, just as it is not part of the stan-
dard in most states.'
60. Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the Unit-
ed States, 9 UCLA L. REV. 44, 58 (1962).
61. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
62. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
63. Id. at 202-03.
64. Id. at 228.
65. See Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 867-68 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating, in a
diversity case, that "filt is unlikely that reciprocity is any longer a federally man-
dated requirement for enforcement of foreign judgments or that the District of Co-
lumbia itself has such a requirement that this court is obliged to follow"); McCord
v. Jet Spray Intl Corp., 874 F. Supp. 436, 437 (D. Mass. 1994) (stating, in a di-
versity case, that "[tihe reciprocity requirement first announced by the Supreme
Court in Hilton v. Guyot ... is no longer an element of the federal law of en-
forcement of foreign judgments"); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note
56, § 481 cmt. d (stating that "[tihough [Hilton's reciprocity requirement] has not
been formally overruled, it is no longer followed in the great majority of State and
federal courts"). But see Gordon & Breach Science Publishers v. American Inst. of
Physics, 905 F. Supp. 169, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (refusing in Lanham Act suit to
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A member of the Study Group advising the Department of
State on the judgment-convention negotiations has suggested
that Congress enact a reciprocity requirement that would be
binding on all U.S. courts recognizing foreign judgments and
thus provide "a negotiating club" to the U.S. representatives in
the Hague.66 Enacting a reciprocity requirement is worth con-
sidering. If done by Congress, it would conform with the view
of the dissenters in Hilton that "it is for the government, and
not for its courts, to adopt the principle of retorsion, if deemed
under any circumstances desirable or necessary."67 If reciproc-
ity is desirable, it should take the form of the Texas provision,
which requires the judgment debtor to establish that the for-
eign country would not recognize a judgment of the U.S. fo-
rum.68 This will avoid the "analytical circle"69 that might re-
sult if both the United States and the foreign country require a
showing of reciprocity before recognizing a judgment from
abroad. Unlike the Texas provision, any Congressional require-
ment should be mandatory and not discretionary.
On the other hand, playing the reciprocity card is likely to
be perceived as the negotiating tactic that it is and make a
successful conclusion even less likely. On balance, I do not
recommend it.
C. Recognition Abroad of U.S. Judgments
Although many countries impose a reciprocity require-
ment, ° recognition of foreign money judgments is common71
give collateral estoppel effect to Swiss and German judgments against the plain-
tiffs and stating "lack of reciprocity" as one reason).
66. Adler, supra note 18, at 109.
67. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 234 (1895) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting, joined
by Harlan, J., Brewer, J., and Jackson, J.).
68. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.005(b)(7) (West 1997).
69. Brand, supra note 39, at 283.
70. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56, § 481 Reporters'
Note 6(d) (stating that in Germany "foreign judgments will be recognized, but only
on the basis of reciprocity"); Brand, supra note 39, at 255 (stating that "enforce-
ment of United States judgments overseas is often possible only if the United
States court rendering the judgment would enforce a similar decision of the foreign
enforcing court"); Barbara Kulzer, Some Aspects of Enforceability of Foreign Judg.
ments: A Comparative Summary, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 84, 88 (1966) (stating that
"[r]eciprocity is an important concept on the Continent"); Bernardo Rodriguez Ossa,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP.,
Sept. 30, 1996, at 18 (stating that Colombian courts require reciprocity in order to
recognize foreign judgments); Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., The Enforcement of Foreign
[Vol. =XI:1178
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and recent changes have accelerated the trend toward recogni-
tion.72 In 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada held that, as
between Canadian provinces, judgments of one province must
be recognized and enforced in another if the basis for personal
jurisdiction over the defendant was sufficient for domestic
judgments in the recognizing province." Previously, judg-
ments, even from another Canadian province, were recognized
only if the basis for personal jurisdiction had been one of the
narrow grounds that preceded modern long-arm statutes: citi-
zenship, residence, voluntary appearance, or prior agree-
ment.74 More importantly for purposes of international rec-
Court Judgments in the People's Republic of China: What the American Lawyer
Needs to Know, 23 BROOK J. INA L. 241, 260 (1997) (stating that "[wihen there
is no treaty between [China and another nation], the principle of mutual reciproci-
ty must be used"); Morio Takeshita, The Recognition of Foreign Judgments by the
Japanese Courts, 39 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 55, 72-73 (1996) (discussing Japan's
reciprocity requirement).
71. See Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that
even if reciprocity were required for enforcement "we would still enforce the Israeli
judgment since Israel in all probability would enforce a similar American judg-
ment"); McCord v. Jet Spray Int'l Corp., 874 F. Supp. 436, 439-40 (D. Mass. 1994)
(holding that Belgium meets the reciprocity requirement imposed under Massachu-
setts law for recognition of a foreign money judgment); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 56, § 481 Reporters' Note 6 (discussing enforcement of for-
eign judgments in Great Britain, Canada, France, and Germany); Marcelo Bombau,
Enforcement of Foreign Awards, 49 INT'L COM. LITIG. 41 (1995) (discussing enforce-
ment in Argentina); Adrian U. Dtrig, The Finality of U.S. Judgments in Civil
Matters as a Prerequisite for Recognition and Enforcement in Switzerland, 32 TEL
INT'L L.J. 271, 275 (1997) (stating that Switzerland recognizes foreign decisions
and does not review the judgment on the merits); Ossa, supra note 70, at 18
(stating that foreign judgments "may be recognized and accepted by Colombian
courts without re-trial or examination of the merits"); Takeshita, supra note 70, at
57-58 (stating that re-examination of the merits in Japanese courts is prohibited
at the recognition stage by case precedent and at the execution stage by statute);
id. at 74 (stating that "most non-recognition cases are concerned with judgments
emanating from the United States" and that u[t]his seems to reflect the differences
in thinking between the two countries with regard to matters such as jurisdiction-
al basis, service abroad, damages, and custody").
72. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
73. See De Savoye v. Morguard Investments Ltd., 76 D.L.R.4th 256 (Can.
1990); cf. T.D.I. Hospitality Management Consultants, Inc. v. Browne, 117
D.L.R.4th 289, 296-97 (Manitoba CA 1994) (holding that under Morguard, suit
can be brought on an Alberta judgment even though the judgment could not be
registered because of the restrictive jurisdictional requirements of the Manitoba
registration act); Sims v. Bower, 108 D.L.R.4th 677, 680 (New Brunswick CA
1993) (holding Morguard inapplicable to overturn restrictive jurisdictional require-
ments of New Brunswick foreign-judgment registration act).
74. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text discussing the current United
Kingdom rule that is the same as the former Canadian practice.
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ognition, some Canadian courts have applied the new relaxed
jurisdictional requirements to U.S. judgments," although oth-
ers have not.76 Recent legislation in Italy and China facili-
tates recognition of foreign judgments.7 Perhaps the best
known change in favor of recognition of foreign judgments, now
more than thirty years ago, is the French Cour de Cassation's
disapproval of revision au fond, under which there was re-
examination of the merits. 8
There are dark spots that could be eliminated by a judg-
ment-recognition treaty. The United Kingdom still clings to a
double standard for personal jurisdiction and, absent a treaty,
will not recognize foreign default judgments unless based on
the nineteenth century bases 9 of service while present, ap-
pearance, or prior consent." Yet, for its own courts, the U.K.
75. See United States v. Ivey, 139 D.L.R.4th 570, 574 (Ontario CA. 1996)
(applying Morguard to judgment of Michigan federal district court); Wilson v. Hull,
128 D.L.R.4th 403, 414 (Alberta C.A. 1995) (refusing to permit registration of
Idaho judgment because of restrictive jurisdictional requirements of registration
act, but leaving open the question of whether suit could be brought to enforce the
judgment); Ivan F. Ivankovich, Enforcing U.S. Judgments in Canada: 'Things are
Looking Up!", 15 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 491, 500 (1995) (reporting on the appli-
cation of Morguard in British Columbia, Alberta, and Prince Edward Island to
recognize U.S. judgments).
76. See Ivankovich, supra note 75, at 504-05 (reporting that New Brunswick
and Saskatchewan courts do not apply Morguard to foreign judgments because of
the provisions of judgment-recognition statutes in those provinces).
77. See Legge 31 Maggio 1995, n.218, Riforma del Sistema Italiano di Diritto
Internazionale Privato, Gazz. Uff. supp. n.68 al n.128 del 3 giugno 1995; Marini,
supra note 23 (reporting on this Italian legislation that took effect on June 1,
1996); Reyes, supra note 70, at 256-58, 266 (reporting on Chinese legislation that
took effect on April 9, 1991, although also stating that there may be difficulties in
enforcement that affect all judgments, including Chinese judgments).
78. See Munzer v. Munzer-Jacoby, Cass le civ., Jan. 7, 1964, J.C.P. 1964, II,
13,590, obs. Ancel. See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56,
§ 481 Reporters' Note 6(c) (discussing enforcement of foreign judgments in France);
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudica-
tions: A Survey and A Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1666 (1968)
(stating that "although there is no formal rule of stare decisis operative in French
law, the issue is probably settled by Munzer").
79. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (stating that a valid judg-
ment may be rendered against a nonresident only if the nonresident is "brought
within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary ap-
pearance").
80. See RESTATFMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56, § 481 Reporters'
Note 6 (stating that "in respect of foreign default judgments, Great Britain does
not recognize many of the bases on which its courts would exercise jurisdiction
over absent defendants"); 1 A.V. DICEY & J.H.C. MORRIS, DICEY & MORRIS ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS Rule 36, at 472-73 (Lawrence Collins ed., 12th ed. 1993) (stat-
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maintains a modern long-arm regime exercising specific juris-
diction"' in contract, maintenance, tort, and other matters.82
Germany has famously rejected on public policy grounds
the punitive damages portion of a judgment for sexual abuse of
a child, but enforced the rest of the judgment.83 This is not
ing that the U.K. will recognize foreign judgments only if required by treaty or
where the basis for jurisdiction was service on the defendant while present, ap-
pearance, or consent). See also Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, ch. 27,
§ 33(1):
For the purposes of determining whether a judgment given by a
court of an overseas country should be recognised or enforced in England
and Wales or Northern Ireland, the person against whom the judgment
was given shall not be regarded as having submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court by reason only of the fact that he appeared (conditionally or
otherwise) in the proceedings for all or any one or more of the following
purposes, namely (a) to contest the jurisdiction of the court; (b) to ask
the court to dismiss or stay the proceedings on the ground that the dis-
pute in question should be submitted to arbitration or to the determina-
tion of the courts of another country;, (c) to protect, or obtain the release
of, property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceedings.
81. "Specific jurisdiction" refers to 'jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit
arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). "General juris-
diction" refers to jurisdiction "over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or re-
lated to the defendants contacts with the forum." Id. at 414 n.9.
82. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, ch. 27, pt. I, § 2 (declaring
that the Brussels Convention, supra note 8, "shall have the force of law in the
United Kingdom"); id. sched. 1 § 2 (reprinting the "special jurisdiction" provisions
of the Convention).
In the nineteenth century, the English double jurisdictional standard for
recognition of judgments might be explained by the fact that even if English
courts considered an English statutory base for jurisdiction to be exorbitant, the
courts had no power to invalidate an act of Parliament. See Schibsby v.
Westenholz, 6 Q.B. 155, 160 (1870) (stating that if a foreigner is sued in an Eng-
lish court, the court must recognize the jurisdictional bases enacted by Parliament
but if the judgment had to be enforced in the United States "a further question
would be open, viz., not only whether the British legislature had given the English
courts jurisdiction over the defendant, but whether he was under any obligation
which the American courts could recognize to submit to the jurisdiction thus creat-
ed"). See also Peter Nygh, The Common Law Approach, in TRANSNATIONAL TORT
LITIGATION: JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES 21, 29-30 (Campbell McLachlan & Peter
Nygh eds., 1996) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL TORT LITIGATION] (explaining current
use of the British double jurisdictional standard as caused by the courts' continued
distrust of statutory enlargement of common law bases).
83. The plaintiff, a fourteen-year old male and an American citizen, sued the
defendant, who had dual United States and German citizenship, for sexual abuse.
Although the defendant was represented by counsel in the preliminary stages of
the litigation, neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared at trial. The plaintiff
was awarded $750,260, which included $400,000 in punitive damages. The German
Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding the 40% contingent fee to plaintiffs
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surprising. Although some countries may recognize judgments
for punitive damages,8 many do not.' The United Kingdom
has gone so far as to pass a "claw-back" statute that not only
refuses to recognize foreign judgments for punitive and mul-
tiple damages, but also authorizes suits to recover any amount
of the judgment already paid that was not purely compensato-
ry86 Australia goes further and permits recovery of the entire
judgment paid in an antitrust action if the country's Attorney
General finds that the foreign court's assumption of jurisdic-
tion is "contrary to international law or inconsistent with inter-
national comity or international practice.""
The decision of the German Supreme Court' is a red flag
warning us that treaty negotiations are likely to focus on puni-
tive and "excessive" damages, particularly U.S. jury awards in
what Lord Denning termed "fabulous" amounts.89 Defense of
lkwyer, the judgment would be enforced in Germany except fQr the punitive dam-
ages. The court stated that it was against German public policy to recognize "a
lump-sum award of punitive damages in a not insubstantial amount." Judgment of
June 4, 1992, BGH, 1992 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJWI 3096 at 3104. For
comments on the decision, see Peter Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement of
American Money-Judgments in Germany-The 1992 Decision of the German Su-
preme Court, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 729 (1992); Joachim Zekoll, The Enforceability of
American Money Judgments Abroad: A Landmark Decision by the German Federal
Court of Justice, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 641 (1992). But cf. Princess Caroline
of Monaco v. Publisher of the Magazines "B" and "G", BGH, 1995 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift [NJW] 861. In Princess Caroline of Monaco the German Supreme
Court held that damages for violation of the right of privacy should be awarded in
an amount sufficient to provide satisfaction to the victim and to deter repetition of
the conduct. The court held that the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals
were not sufficient to have an impact on the defendant or present a genuine
disincentive to such conduct. The case was remanded for a new determination of
damages. Does this judgment authorize a form of punitive damages?
84. Cf. Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages and the Recognition of Judgments,
43 NETHERLANDS INt L. REv. 143, 169-71 (1996) (discussing a Swiss decision); id.
at 147-48 (discussing decisions from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand awarding
punitive damages in domestic cases).
85. See id. at 163-67 (discussing decisions from Germany and Japan); cf. id. at
146-47 (discussing the limits that the House of Lords has imposed on domestic
judgments for punitive damages); Takeshita, supra note 70, at 67 (discussing refus-
al of Japanese courts to recognize a California judgment awarding "absolutely
enormous" punitive damages).
86. See Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6 (Eng.).
87. Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act, 1984, §§ 9(1)(b)(ii), 10
(Austl.).
88. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
89. Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [19831 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (Eng.
C.A. 1982) (Denning, M.R.) (stating that American juries "are prone to award
fabulous damages").
182
HOW SUBSTANTIAL IS OUR NEED?
punitive damages will not be helped by the fact that most
states have, by statute or decision, placed limits on punitive
awards' and that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a
"grossly excessive" award of punitive damages violates due
process." Nor will another U.S. Supreme Court decision, hold-
ing punitive damages taxable because not compensatory, 92
assist our treaty negotiators in defending American practice.
Although the German Supreme Court enforced the com-
pensatory portion of the .tort judgment," and although Ger-
many does not emulate the U.K. in maintaining a double
jurisdictional standard,95 Professor Lowenfeld points out that
a German trial court has refused to recognize a Massachusetts
products liability judgment because the Massachusetts trial
judgment did not contain written reasons for the compensatory
award, which the German court regarded as excessive.9" The
German Supreme Court, on the ground that the judgment was
for a gambling debt, has refused to enforce a U.S. judgment
against a German citizen for losses on a commodity futures
account.9 7 The German Supreme Court has also refused to
enforce a New York judgment rendered on a counterclaim
against the German party because the contract that was the
subject of the dispute permitted the German seller, but not the
American buyer, to bring a suit on the contract outside of Ger-
90. See Brand, supra note 84, at 163 (stating that "at least 40 of the 50
states have imposed some kind of restriction on punitive damages awards, with a
majority of those restrictions being enacted within the past 10 years").
91. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996).
92. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 452, 454, 456 (1996) (holding that
an award of punitive damages in tort suit is taxable because it is not within an
Internal Revenue Code provision excluding from income damages received "on
account of personal injuries or sickness" and stating that punitive damages "do not
compensate for any kind of loss").
93. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
95. See Dennis Campbell & Dharmendra Popat, Enforcing American Money
Judgments in the United Kingdom and Germany, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 517, 540
(1994) (stating that "[uinder German law, the foreign court is regarded as having
international jurisdiction if, in the reverse situation, a German court would be
competen").
96. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIoNAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION
440-44 (1993) (setting out an English translation of Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co.,
[1989] RIW 988 (LG Berlin)). The Solimene case was settled pending appeal. See
id. at 452.
97. See id. at 44446 (setting out an English translation of P. & Co. Inc. v.
T., [1975] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1600 (German Sup. Ct.)).
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many. 8
There are other trouble spots for recognition of U.S. judg-
ments, including Austria, the Netherlands, Norway,99 and
Brazil.0 0 A practitioner,' frustrated with the exequatur"'0
procedure necessary to obtain recognition for a U.S. judgment
in Mexico, has declared U.S. judgments "worthless" south of
the border.0 2
Thus, there are difficulties in enforcing U.S. money judg-
ments abroad. We cannot know the extent of these difficulties
or how they should affect U.S. negotiations for a judgments
treaty without the survey recommended above." 3
Ill. WHAT KIND OF CONVENTION---"SINGLE," "DOUBLE," OR
"MIXED"?
There are three basic forms that a judgments-recognition
convention might take: single, double, and mixed. A single
98. See id. at 446-50 (setting out an English translation of S.A.C. Inc. v. F. &
J., BGHZ 52, 31 (1970), (German Sup. Ct.)).
99. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST
FOR REASONABLENESS 109 & n.1 (1996) (stating that absent a treaty, those coun-
tries do not regard a foreign judgment as having effect outside the rendering
state, but pointing out that Netherlands courts often recognize foreign judgments
even though not required to do so). But see Juenger, supra note 22, at 38 (stating
that the Netherlands has "advanced from a narrow, ethnocentric position to one of
considerable liberality toward judgments rendered outside the Common Market").
100. See Chin Kim & Gretchen Cowen, The Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments under Brazilian Law and the Uniform Foreign Money-Judg-
ments Recognition Act, 5 TRANSNATL LAW. 725, 735 (1992) (stating that Brazil will
recognize a foreign judgment only if "the Brazilian domiciliary expressly submits to
the foreign courts jurisdiction").
101. An exequatur procedure results in issuance of a writ that renders a for-
eign judgment subject to execution in the same manner as a domestic judgment.
The formalities required for the procedure differ from country to country and can
be onerous. See Kulzer, supra note 70, at 89 n.29 (describing exequatur in France);
Jorge A. Vargas, Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards in Mexico, 5
U.S.-MEX. L.J. 137, 147 (1997) (stating that exequatur is also known as
homologaclon in Mexico).
102. David W. Kash, Enforcement of Judgments: Across the Border with Mexico,
ARIZ. ATI Y, July 1995, at 11, 13 (stating that a U.S. judgment is "worthless ex-
cept in limited circumstances"). See also Matthew H. Adler, Enforcement in a New
Age: Judgments in the United States and Mexico, 5 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 149, 152 (1997)
(stating that a litigant can block enforcement of a U.S. judgment by bringing par-
allel litigation in Mexico); Vargas, supra note 101, at 147 (stating that even
though all conditions for exequatur or homologacfon "are fully complied with, there
is no guarantee the foreign judgment will be enforced").
103. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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convention focuses solely on recognition and enforcement, list-
ing the bases for jurisdiction that will entitle a judgment to
recognition, but permitting judgments on other bases that a
contracting state may, in its discretion, enforce."4 A double
convention lists the exclusive bases for jurisdiction, a "white"
list, and may also contain a list of prohibited bases for jurisdic-
tion, a "black" list.0 5 A mixed convention contains a white
list, perhaps a black list, and also provides that a signatory
may, but need not, recognize judgments on bases not on either
the white or black list.' The Inter-American Judgments
Convention,'1 which the United States has not ratified, is a
form of mixed convention with a white list, but no black
list.0
8
Variations on the single, double, and mixed convention
forms provide seven major possibilities for a judgments conven-
tion. One: jurisdiction is not dealt with and signatory countries
agree to recognize any judgment that is valid under the stan-
dards of the rendering state. It is unlikely that any country
would ratify such a convention.0 9 Two: a signatory state
must recognize a foreign judgment that meets the receiving
state's domestic jurisdictional standards."0 Three: the con-
vention contains no black list, but an exclusive white list and
judgments on other bases may not be recognized. Four: the
convention contains no black list and permits recognition of
judgments that are not on its white list. The Uniform Act is
not a convention, but it is in this form."' Five: the convention
contains a black list and a white list. The lists are exclusive for
104. See von Mehren, supra note 2, at 282.
105. See id. at 282-83.
106. See id. at 283.
107. Inter-American Convention, supra note 10.
108. See id. arts. 1-3 (listing those jurisdictional bases that entitle a judgment
to recognition); id. art. 8 (providing that a[tihe rules contained in this Convention
shall not limit any broader provisions contained in bilateral or multilateral conven-
tions among the States Parties regarding jurisdiction in the international sphere or
more favorable practices in regard to the extraterritorial validity of foreign judg-
ments").
109. See Juenger, supra note 22, at 12 (stating that no legal system "accords
automatic recognition, sight unseen, to foreign adjudications").
110. See Adler, supra note 18, at 97 (referring to this as a "simple, or single
convention").
111. See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 42, § 5 (listing in (a) the bases that satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement and then concluding in (b) "[tihe courts of this state
may recognize other bases for jurisdiction").
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judgments entitled to recognition, but, for domestic purposes, a
signatory is free to exercise jurisdiction even on a black list
basis. Six: the convention contains a black list and a white list
that are mandatory if the defendant is domiciled in a signatory
state, but not if the defendant is a non-domiciliary. The Brus-
sels Convention is in this form."2 Seven: the convention con-
tains a black list and a white list, but signatories are free to
adjudicate on other bases not on the black list and other signa-
tories may, but need not, enforce such judgments.
Number seven, black list, white list, and "gray" jurisdic-
tional bases for discretionary enforcement, is the form referred
to as "mixed," and is the type of convention proposed by the
U.S. negotiators."' The Kessedjian Report, however, notes
that "the Special Commission of 1994 showed a clear tendency
to reject the possibility of negotiating a mixed Convention" and
states as "the maximum goal" a strict double Convention in
order to "give litigants the greatest possible degree of predict-
ability.""' Apparently then, the United States must press for
a double convention that contains a black list and a white list,
but that, like the Brussels Convention, does not forbid the use
of even black list jurisdiction against defendants not domiciled
in signatory countries."5 This will give U.S. defendants pro-
tection against the Brussels Convention's black list"' and
permit U.S. courts limited use of general jurisdiction founded
on bases such as temporary presence or on continuous and sys-
tematic activities, which are likely to be black-listed in the
forthcoming convention."
112. See Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 3 (listing bases that "shall not
be applicable as against" domiciliaries of contracting states); id art. 4 (permitting
use of Article 3 basis against defendants not domiciled in a contracting state); id.
arts. 2, 5, and art. 6 (setting forth a white list).
113. See von Mehren, supra note 2, at 281 (stating that "a state can on occa-
sion appropriately exercise jurisdiction in situations where another state has legiti-
mate grounds for refusing recognition of the resulting judgment"). Arthur T. von
Mehren notes that "[tihe U.S. proposal to the Hague Conference is for a conven-
tion mixte." Id. at 283.
114. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 88.
115. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
117. Jurisdiction based on service "on the defendant during his temporary pres-
ence" in the forum is black-listed in the Brussels Convention. Brussels Convention,
supra note 8, art. 3. The Convention's only basis for general jurisdiction is domi-
cile, which for a company is defined as its "seat." Id. arts. 2, 53.
Giving up general jurisdiction based on continuous and systematic forum
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IV. THE CONVENTION'S JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS
A. Problems Created by U.S. Doctrine
U.S. negotiators will have difficulty obtaining agreement
on both black list and white list items. U.S. jurisdictional law,
primarily as developed by the Supreme Court of the United
States, permits suit on bases considered exorbitant abroad and,
paradoxically, refuses to approve bases readily accepted else-
where."8 Black-listing jurisdictional bases approved by the
U.S. Supreme Court creates a political but not a constitutional
problem for our negotiators. White-listing bases rejected by the
Supreme Court does present probably insuperable constitu-
tional difficulties.
The first problem will be keeping mainstays of U.S. juris-
dictional law off the black list. One U.S. doctrine that offends
Europeans is general jurisdiction based on continuous and
systematic activities in the forum."' Professor Peter
Schlosser, author of the Schlosser Report, an important tool for
construing the Brussels Convention, 2 ' has published re-
marks in which he assumes "the role of a hypothetical friendly
adviser to the United States" in its negotiations for a judg-
ments convention.'2 He states that Europeans "do not see
how doing business unrelated to the lawsuit could establish
jurisdiction."' Professor Schlosser points to an extreme ex-
contacts is less of a sacrifice after Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). Helicopteros restricts use of general jurisdiction based
on forum contacts and, in that case, held it unconstitutional to exercise such juris-
diction over a company that not only had negotiated a contract in the forum, the
faulty performance of which had resulted in the cause of action, but also had
purchased most of its equipment and trained its personnel there. Id. at 410-11,
418-19.
118. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1027, 1045 (1995) (stating that "as long as our highest court persists in its
misguided attempt to derive jurisdictional law from two incongruent sources-due
process and state sovereignty-we cannot effectively deal with other nations").
119. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438, 445 (1952)
(finding it "reasonable and just" to exercise jurisdiction over a Philippine corpora-
tion that conducted "continuous and systematic" activities in the forum).
120. The report was written when the Convention was revised to permit the
accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. See Peter F. Schlosser,
Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems and American Cooperation with Those
Systems, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 9, 9 n.* (1996) (containing brief biography of Profes-
sor Schlosser by Professor Robert C. Casad).
121. Id. at 39.
122. Id. at 42. See also Campbell McLachlan, Transnational Tort Litigation: An
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ample that based general jurisdiction on business activities in
the forum, Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Intl,' which he char-
acterizes as illustrating "a narrow protectionist approach
which [Europeans] will certainly not accept."1" Both the
Kessedjian Report and the conclusions of the Working Group
appointed by a Hague Special Commission to study the pro-
posal for a judgments convention, single out general jurisdic-
tion based on doing business for probable inclusion on the
black list, though, with obvious reference to the U.S. position,
they note that there is not a consensus on this.'
As previously noted, 6  after Helicopteros"2 ' there is
theoretically less opportunity to utilize doing business as a
basis for general jurisdiction, although some state courts con-
tinue to flout that attempt to rein in the doctrine.'28 Agreeing
to black list general jurisdiction based on forum contacts other
than domicile or the seat of a company will block suit in
only a few cases in which the United States has a legitimate
interest in providing a forum"--cases like Frummer in
Overview, in TRANSNATIONAL TORT LITIGAnON, supra note 82, at 1, 16 (stating
that "[iun practice, the doing business test is significantly wider than notions of
domicile as recognized ... in civil law systems or notions of presence of corpora-
tions recognized in the English common law").
123. 227 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1967). Frummer upheld jurisdiction over a London
hotel because the hotel, an English subsidiary of a Delaware corporation, used a
reservation service also owned by the Delaware corporation. Id. at 854. At its New
York office, the reservation service advertised and booked reservations for the
London hotel, although the plaintiff did not use the reservation service on this
occasion. Id. at 852-54. Suit was for injuries incurred by a fall in a bathtub in the
London hotel. Id. at 855.
124. Schlosser, supra note 120, at 42.
125. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 80; Working Group Conclusions,
supra note 2, at 261.
126. See supra note 117.
127. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
128. See, e.g., Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1990). Schlobohm
upholds jurisdiction over an individual based on his "continuing and systematic"
contacts with the forum, id. at 359, and cites Helicopteros for the proposition that
"where the defendant's activities in the forum are continuing and systematic, juris-
diction may be proper without a relationship between defendant's particular act
and the cause of action." Id. at 357.
129. These are the only bases for general jurisdiction under the Brussels Con-
vention. See supra note 117.
130. I regard cases in which a foreign plaintiff injured abroad is forum-shop-
ping in the United States as ones in which the United States does not have a
legitimate interest in providing a forum. Eliminating doing business as a basis for
general jurisdiction will prevent such suits against foreign defendants.
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which an American plaintiff is injured abroad. This is not
much of a price to pay if a widely adopted judgments conven-
tion is otherwise useful and feasible. It is desirable and should
be possible to retain this form of general jurisdiction in inter-
state cases. A plaintiff injured in a sister state should be able
to sue at home if a tortfeasor is engaged in continuous and
systematic transactions in the plaintiffs domicile, even though
these transactions are unrelated to the injury.
The Kessedjian Report and the Working Group also select
service on the defendant while temporarily present as a black
list candidate, though again, they note a lack of consensus. 3'
In Burnham v. Superior Court,"2 the Supreme Court unani-
mously approved "tag"' jurisdiction, but the defendant in
Burnham was from New Jersey" and there was ample basis
for suing him in California for additional child support without
relying on his presence when served. Mr. Burnham, contrary to
his agreement with his wife, sued for divorce in New Jer-
sey.'35 The New Jersey courts dismissed his suit and told him
to litigate the divorce in California finding that he "had delib-
erately and unfairly manipulated [Mrs. Burnham] into moving
to California so that he could bring his divorce action in New
Jersey where it would be the most convenient for him and
most inconvenient for [her]."" 6 Thus, Mr. Burnham induced
his wife and children to go to California before Mrs. Burnham
obtained a child support decree and the children were there in
need of his support. Surely this is sufficient for specific juris-
diction over Mr. Burnham to obtain child support even if he
had never set foot in California.1
37
131. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 82; Working Group Conclusions,
supra note 2, at 261.
132. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
133. This term was apparently first used in Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v.
Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 75 (1978).
134. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 607.
135. Id. at 607.
136. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix H, at app.
4, Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (No. 89-44) (appending
Burnham v. Burnham, No. A-1522-88T2/A-5705-87T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
July 24, 1989)).
137. See Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1996) § 201(5), 9 pt. I U.L.A.
272, 282 (Supp. 1997) (providing for jurisdiction over a nonresident to establish a
support order when "the child resides in this State as a result of the acts or di-
rectives of the individual"). The comment cautions that "an overly literal construc-
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If the United States wishes to retain tag jurisdiction for
interstate cases, so be it. The arguments for this are really
arguments for nationwide jurisdiction when, as in Burnham,
the forum has an interest in providing a remedy for the plain-
tiff and there is no unfairness to the defendant. Perhaps the
Supreme Court would not extend Burnham to a case in which
the defendant was from a foreign country. 8' In any event, we
will have to agree to black list tag jurisdiction if we want a
convention.
Another problem that U.S. jurisdictional doctrine creates
for our negotiators is that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected
bases for jurisdiction that are white-listed under the Brussels
Convention. Kulko v. Superior Court.9 denied jurisdiction in
a child support suit brought at the child's domicile even though
the father acquiesced in the child's going there to join her
mother. The Brussels Convention permits jurisdiction in sup-
port suits wherever "the maintenance creditor is domiciled or
habitually resident."" The Kessedjian Report labels any
tion of the terms of the statute will overreach due process," id. at 283, but this
should not be a danger on the facts of Burnham. The comment may have in mind
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), which denied jurisdiction over a fa-
ther who had acquiesced in his daughter's wish to join her mother. The mother
had moved to California. For discussion of Kulko and the problem it poses for
convention negotiations, see infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
138. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56, § 421(2)(a)
(stating that service on the defendant while present in the forum confers jurisdic-
tion only if the defendant is present "other than transitorily"); id- cmt. e (stating
that 'Jjurisdiction based on service of process on a person only transitorily in the
territory of the state, is not generally acceptable under international law").
139. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
140. Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(2). Jurisdiction under art. 5(2)
was even upheld in a suit for child support by an unmarried Irish mother against
a putative Belgium father, who denied paternity. See Case C-295/95, Farrell v.
Long, [1997] 3 W.L.R. 613, 626 (Ct. Justice of E.C.) (stating that Article 5(2) ap-
plies "to all actions brought in maintenance matters, including the initial action
brought by a person applying for maintenance, and that consideration of the ques-
tion of paternity as a preliminary issue in such proceedings did not prompt the
authors of the Convention to adopt any different solution"). The report does not
state whether the mother was allegedly impregnated by the putative father in Ire-
land. Where the mother was impregnated is apparently irrelevant under Article
5(2), but is crucial under due process. Impregnating a forum resident in the forum
meets the due process test for support jurisdiction. See Larsen v. Scholl, 296
N.W.2d 785, 787 (Iowa 1980) (upholding jurisdiction over nonresident who alleg-
edly impregnated Iowa mother in Iowa). Jurisdiction has even been upheld when
intercourse in the forum did not result in the pregnancy. Howells v. McKibben,
281 N.W.2d 154, 155, 159 (Minn. 1979) (upholding jurisdiction over Wisconsin
resident who allegedly impregnated a Minnesota mother in Wisconsin, but who
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weakening of the Brussels Convention provisions for mainte-
nance jurisdiction "a regrettable backward step" and states
that if the U.S. position on this matter is maintained, the fu-
ture convention will likely exclude maintenance obligations
from its scope.'
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court' rejected
jurisdiction in California over the maker of a component part.
The suit was one for contribution and indemnity by the manu-
facturer of the product who had settled a suit for injury and
death allegedly caused in California by the defective part.
Under the Brussels Convention there would have been jurisdic-
tion pursuant to Article 5(3), which provides jurisdiction in tort
suits "where the harmful event occurred"" or 6(2), which
permits impleader for contribution and indemnity "in the court
seised of the original proceedings."' Moreover, the Court of
Justice of the European Communities has given Article 5(3) an
expansive interpretation, holding that a Netherlands horticul-
tural company could sue in the Netherlands for damage to its
seedbeds caused by defendant's alleged discharging of pollut-
ants into the Rhine River in France. 45
In Asahi, four of the justices would have reduced the
stream of commerce to a pathetic trickle by denying jurisdic-
tion over the component part maker even in a suit on behalf of
the maimed and killed Californians because, even though the
part manufacturer was aware that commercial distribution of
the product would reach California, there was no act by that
defendant "purposefully directed toward the forum State."46
also had intercourse with her in Minnesota). On the other hand, the fact that the
mother has come to the forum to give birth, is not sufficient for jurisdiction over
the father. Barnhart v. Madvig, 526 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Tenn. 1975) (denying juris-
diction when mother impregnated in another state and "elected to come to Tennes-
see to have her child").
141. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 20. But cf. Working Group Conclu-
sions, supra note 2, at 259 (stating that "the Group was inclined not to favour
inclusion of a forum such as [provided in the Brussels Convention for maintenance
suits]" and leaving open the question of whether to exclude such suits from the
convention's scope (emphasis in original)).
142. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
143. Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(3).
144. Id. art. 6(2).
145. Case 21176, Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, 1976 E.C.R. 1735, [1977] 1
C.M.L.R. 284.
146. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Powell, J.
and Scalia, J.) (emphasis in original).
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Federal and state courts have differed on whether they are
bound to follow this part of the opinion, and some have reject-
ed it as unduly restrictive and not authoritative because it did
not receive five votes.147
Perhaps not so surprisingly, the European negotiators may
welcome adopting the "purposefully directed" requirement that
got four votes in Asahi. European product manufacturers
are not eager to be subject to damage suits wherever the chain
of commercial distribution brings their product. Professor
Schlosser states that if the U.S. negotiators insist on inserting
a "purposeful availment" requirement into the Convention's
tort long-arm provision, he does "not think that this will meet
major objections."'49 Both the Working Group and the
Kessedjian Report express disenchantment with the expansive
interpretation of Brussels Convention Article 5(3) by the Court
of Justice of the European Communities. 5 '
Apparently then, the way is smoothed for incorporating a
narrow tort long-arm provision in the convention. I am opposed
to any provision that shields from U.S. jurisdiction foreign
manufacturers whose products have reached the United States
in the normal course of commercial distribution and caused
injury here. I would rather not have a convention and take a
chance that a future U.S. Supreme Court will rule that a
manufacturer's act of introducing its product into the chain of
commercial distribution renders the manufacturer subject to
147. See, e.g., Ham v. La Cienga Music Co., 4 F.3d 413, 416 n.11 (5th Cir.
1993) (stating that the Fifth Circuit will continue to follow its pre-Asahi cases
absent rejection of those cases by a Supreme Court majority); Showa Denko KM.
v. Pangle, 414 S.E.2d 658 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Cox v. Hozelock, Ltd., 411 S.E.2d
640 (N.C. App. 1992); Hill v. Showa Denko K., 425 S.E.2d 609 (W. Va. 1992).
But see Boit v. Gar-Tec Prod., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992) (adopting
"Justice O'Connor's plurality view" and citing cases in accord from the 1st, 8th,
and 11th circuits). Boit's inclusion of the Eighth Circuit is thrown into doubt by
Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 614 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding that a seller may not insulate itself from jurisdiction by utilizing a
multi-level distribution system and noting that five justices in Asahi did not share
Justice O'Connor's view).
148. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
149. Schlosser, supra note 120, at 41.
150. See, e.g., KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 70 (stating that the Court's
decision "makes too much room for concurrent jurisdiction"); Working Group Con-
clusions, supra note 2, at 259 (stating that the Court's interpretation of art. 5(3)
"might be too broad in the context of a worldwide convention"). Both are referring
to the Bier case. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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suit wherever along that chain its product causes harm. I sus-
pect that U.S. plaintiffs' attorneys will agree and muster the
political forces necessary to prevent ratification of a convention
that would force U.S. victims of defective products to sue for-
eign manufacturers abroad if the manufacturers take the pre-
caution of parting with the product early in the distribution
process.
B. A Convention Cannot Trump the U.S. Supreme Court
If the convention white lists bases for jurisdiction that the
U.S. Supreme Court has rejected as a violation of due process,
the Court may reconsider and overrule cases that declare un-
reasonable what an international consensus regards as desir-
able. 5' Another less likely possibility is that the Court may
adopt a more relaxed due process standard to test the reason-
ableness of the jurisdictional bases of foreign judgments.'52 If
the Court neither overrules cases restricting the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts nor adopts a more forgiving international standard
for foreign judgments, there is no likelihood that the conven-
tion can overcome due process objections to recognition of for-
eign judgments that use the offending bases.
Any argument to the contrary recalls a bizarre chapter in
U.S. constitutional history involving a treaty between the Unit-
ed States and the U.K for the protection of migratory birds. 5 '
Congress enacted legislation to implement the treaty, but in
151. See Carol S. Bruch, Statutory Reform of Constitutional Doctrine: Fitting In-
ternational Shoe to Family Law, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1047, 1058 (1995) (stating
that "we can expect the Court to understand and defer to well-thought-out juris-
dictional schemes, even when they deviate from announced Supreme Court doc-
trine"); Juenger, supra note 118, at 1044 (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court
"might well be prepared" to 'countenance a change of jurisdictional bases by trea-
ty").
152. See Willis L.M. Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered
Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783, 796 (1950) (stating that "if the Constitution
should apply [to recognition of a foreign judgment] the standard of due process
would be similar if not identical to that of natural justice, since both are equated
to the criterion of reasonableness"); Smit, supra note 60, at 47 (stating that "con-
sideration of all relevant circumstances might-at least in some cases-warrant the
conclusion that domestic recognition of a foreign judgment would not violate due
process, even though the foreign proceedings did not on all counts measure up to
standards domestically applied").
153. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, proclaimed Dec. 8, 1916,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., 39 Stat. 1702.
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Missouri v. Holland" the state of Missouri sued to enjoin a
U.S. game warden from enforcing the statute. Under the re-
stricted view of the commerce power, which then prevailed, 5
Missouri claimed "that the statute is an unconstitutional inter-
ference with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth
Amendment."'56 Two federal district court opinions had inval-
idated an earlier statute "that attempted by itself and not in
pursuance of a treaty to regulate the killing of migratory birds
within the States."'57 Justice Holmes, writing for a majority
of the Court, upheld the treaty and the statute158 stating that
"[aicts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when
made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are de-
clared to be so when made under the authority of the United
States."'59 Although Holmes did not cite a constitutional pro-
vision, he was referring to the Supremacy Clause of the Con-
stitution: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... '
Holmes also stated, however, that "[w]e do not mean to
imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making
power; but they must be ascertained in a different way""'6
and that "[tihe treaty in question does not contravene any
prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution."'62 Never-
theless, the notion that a treaty could legitimize Congressional
action that would otherwise be unconstitutional created contro-
versy and triggered an unsuccessful attempt to amend the
Constitution to declare that "[a treaty shall become effective
as internal law in the United States only through legislation
which would be valid in the absence of a treaty."63
154. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
155. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (holding uncon-
stitutional as exceeding the commerce power of Congress an act prohibiting the
transportation in interstate commerce of goods produced by child labor).
156. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431.
157. Id. at 432 (citing United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (D.C.E.D. Ark.
1914), and United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D.C. Kan. 1915)).
158. Id. at 435.
159. Id. at 433.
160. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
161. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
162. Id.
163. S.J. Res. 43, 82d Cong. (1953) (the so-called "Bricker Amendment," named
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Finally Justice Black sought to end the controversy. Reid
v. Covert' invalidated' application of a provision of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice to civilian dependents who ac-
companied members of the armed forces overseas in time of
peace. Justice Black rejected an attempt to justify the Code
provision as implementing U.S. treaties with Great Britain and
with Japan.'65 He stated that there was nothing in the lan-
guage of the Supremacy Clause'66 "which intimates that trea-
ties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply
with the provisions of the Constitution."'67 He explained Mis-
souri v. Holland'68 as simply recognizing that "[t]o the extent
that the United States can validly make treaties, the people
and the States have delegated their power to the National
Government and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier."'69
Thus, no treaty can authorize the use of bases for personal
jurisdiction that have been held to violate due process. The
Supreme Court can take the occasion of the treaty to reconsid-
er and perhaps overrule its former decisions, or may apply a
different international standard to foreign judgments. It would
be foolhardy to negotiate with the assumption that the Court
will take either action.
C. Specific Jurisdiction in Libel Actions
Another clash between the Brussels Convention and U.S.
Supreme Court jurisdictional decisions is one in which the
result reached by the European Court of Justice is so sensible
that the Supreme Court might be especially amenable to re-
thinking its conclusion. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
after the Senator who sponsored it). See Michael J. Glennon, Process Versus Policy
in Foreign Relations: Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 1542, 1543 (1997) (reviewing LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTrIUTON (2d ed. 1996)) (referring to "[t]he Bricker Amend-
ment, a constitutional amendment proposed in 1953 that would have presumed all
treaties to be nonself-executing").
164. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
165. Id. at 16 (joined by Warren, C.J., Douglas, J., and Brennan, J.).
Whittaker, J. took no part. Id. at 41. Frankfurter, J. and Harlan, J. concurred in
the result. Id. at 41, 65. Clark, J. dissented in an opinion joined by Burton, J. Id.
at 78. Thus, Justice Black wrote for a plurality.
166. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
167. Reid, 354 U.S. at 16.
168. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
169. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18.
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Inc.,170 a woman, allegedly libeled in several issues of the de-
fendant magazine, brought her suit for damages in a New
Hampshire federal court. The plaintiff was a New York resi-
dent and "one percent or less" of each issue of the magazine in
which plaintiff claimed that she was defamed was distributed
in New Hampshire.17' The reason that she sued there was
that the statute of limitations had expired in every state ex-
cept New Hampshire, which had an "unusually long (6-year)
limitations period for libel actions." 172 The Supreme Court
held that defendant's "regular circulation of magazines in the
forum State is sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction
in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine.'
The Court then added, "[tihis is so even if New Hampshire
courts, and thus the District Court under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Mfg. Co . ... . , would apply the so-called 'single
publication rule'175 to enable [plaintiffl to recover in the New
Hampshire action her damages from 'publications' of the al-
leged libel throughout the United States."76 On remand, the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire responded to questions cer-
tified to it by the First Circuit 77 and declared that under
New Hampshire law a single action could be brought to recover
for harm in all states in which the magazines had been pub-
lished and that the New Hampshire six-year statute of limita-
tions applied to recovery for harm suffered in other states.'
Thus, the benighted rule that the forum's statute of limitations
applies in all cases179 was combined with a jurisdictional rule
170. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
171. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 828 F.2d 64, 67 (lst Cir. 1987).
172. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 773.
173. Id. at 773-74.
174. 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941). Klaxon held that in diversity cases, federal
district courts must apply the choice-of-law rules of the states in which they sit.
175. The "single publication rule" provides that only one cause of action arises
from a single edition of a book or newspaper no matter how many copies are
published and, in that action, damages can be recovered for harm suffered wherev-
er the copies were published. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(3), (4)
(1977).
176. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774 (footnotes added).
177. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 828 F.2d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 1987).
178. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1188, 1197 (N.H.
1988).
179. The RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS originally treated a statute of limitations
as a matter of "procedure" so that if the forum's time for suit had not expired,
actions could be brought even for wrongs governed in other respects by the law of
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that permitted a nonresident to sue a magazine for harm
caused outside the forum when the defendant's only forum
contact was distribution of less than one percent of its maga-
zines.
Far more sensible is the decision of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities in Shevill v. Presse Alliance,
180
which held that:
[Tihe victim of a libel by a newspaper article distributed in
several Contracting States may bring an action for damages
against the publisher either before the courts of the Contract-
ing State of the place where the publisher of the defamatory
publication is established, which have jurisdiction to award
damages for all the harm caused by the defamation, or before
the courts of each Contracting State in which the publication
was distributed and where the victim claims to have suffered
injury to his reputation, which have jurisdiction to rule solely
in respect of the harm caused in the state of the court
seised.'
states where suit was barred by passage of time. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 604 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 142(2),
143 (1971) (unless the foreign statute barred "the right and not merely the reme-
dy"). It was not until the second Restatement was revised that the forum was
prevented from applying its longer statute of limitations if "maintenance of the
claim would serve no substantial interest of the forum; and the claim would be
barred under the statute of limitations of a state having a more significant rela-
tionship to the parties and the occurrence." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 142(2) (rev. ed. 1989). It is doubtful that the revised Restatement rule
would have changed the decision of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire which
stated that it had a "substantial" interest in permitting suit because a significant
number of defendant's magazines were distributed in New Hampshire. Keeton, 549
A.2d at 1193. In Keeton, application of the New Hampshire six-year statute was
particularly bizarre because by the time of the New Hampshire Supreme Court's
decision the statute had been changed to three years and under the new statute,
which did not apply retroactively, suit would have been barred even in New
Hampshire. See Keeton, 549 A.2d at 1188, 1196.
180. Case C-68/93, 1995 E.C.R. 1-450.
181. Id. at 1-462. Cf David Syme & Co. v. Grey, 115 A.L.R. 247 (AustL. Fed.
Ct. 1992). The plaintiff sued in the Australian Capital Territory for defamation
resulting from publication there and in other Australian territories. The Federal
Court of Australia ordered the action stayed with leave for the plaintiff to amend
the pleadings to recover only for harm resulting from publication in the forum
territory. Id. at 293. The defendant was "not present, and does not carry on busi-
ness" in the Capital Territory. Id. at 250 (Neaves, J.). The plaintiff did not serve
process in accordance with Australian "cross-vesting" legislation, which extends
"the scope of valid service of originating process of all Australian courts to the
limits of the Australian nation." Id. at 291 (Higgins, J.).
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Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court could be persuaded to
reconsider Keeton and conform to the Shevill holding, at least
for foreign defendants when the bulk of publications are out-
side of the United States. To permit Keeton's forum shopping
in international cases would be particularly offensive. Justice
Souter, while sitting on the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
dissented in Keeton on the ground that "New Hampshire's
limitation period may not properly be applied" to harm in oth-
er states.182 If the U.S. Supreme Court does not rein in the
Keeton opinion, this will mark another instance in which due
process permits what the Europeans regard as exorbitant.
Black-listing jurisdiction to recover for harm caused by libel
published outside a forum that is not the defendant's principal
place of business or place of incorporation would encourage
reconsideration of Keeton.
D. The "White List"
It is almost certain that the bases that will be approved
for general jurisdiction" are the domicile, or perhaps less
technically, habitual residence of an individual,' and the
principal place of business or place of incorporation of a com-
pany."8 Other likely grounds for general jurisdiction are
knowing and voluntary consent either before or after suit is
brought,'86 with exceptions to protect consumers8 7 and em-
ployees" from contracts of adhesion and possible exceptions
182. Keeton, 549 A.2d 1187, 1205 (Souter, J., dissenting).
183. See supra note 81.
184. See KEssEDJAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 78 (recommending habitual resi-
dence). See also Inter-American Convention, supra note 10, art. I(A)(1) (permitting
suit against a "natural person" at "his domicile or habitual residence").
185. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 78 (recommending "the place of
the principal establishment or head office" as a basis for general jurisdiction
against a "legal person"); see also Inter-American Convention, supra note 10, art.
I(A)(1) (permitting suit against a 'juridical person" at "its principal place of busi-
ness"); id. art. l(A)(2) (permitting suit against a "private non-commercial or busi-
ness enterprise" at "its principal place of business" or where it is "organized").
186. See Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 17 (permitting agreement to
exclusive jurisdiction "to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise
in connection with a particular legal relationship"); Inter-American Convention,
supra note 10, art. 1(A)(4) (providing for jurisdiction if the defendant has consent-
ed in writing or has entered a general appearance).
187. See Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 15(1) (providing that a con-
sumer can agree to be sued outside of her domicile only "after the dispute has
arisen").
188. See id arts. 5(1), 17 (Article 17 providing that an agreement conferring
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if the convention provides that some matters shall be in the
exclusive jurisdiction of designated courts. 8 9
The most likely bases for specific jurisdiction"9 are tort
and contract long-arm jurisdiction, but what form these provi-
sions will take is doubtful. As indicated above, 9' the Europe-
ans are not anxious to duplicate the expansive tort jurisdiction
effected when the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties gave a literal reading to the Brussels Convention's words
"where the harmful event occurred."92 At the other extreme,
jurisdiction should not be circumscribed by requiring that the
defendant's activities be "purposefully directed" toward the
forum, as favored by four Justices in Asahi. 9' A desirable
compromise is that, in product liability cases, a manufacturer
be subject to jurisdiction wherever the product causes personal
injury or property damage if the defendant could foresee that
the product would reach that forum in the ordinary channels of
commercial distribution.'
The Kessedjian Report states that "[i]f it is decided to in-
clude a special jurisdiction rule for contracts, we should not
take inspiration from the text of Article 5.1 of the Brussels
Convention."'95 That article provides jurisdiction "in matters
relating to a contract [other than an employment contract], in
the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in
jurisdiction over an employee is valid "only if entered into after the dispute has
arisen or if the employee invokes it to seise courts other than those for the
defendant's domicile" and cross-referencing Article 5 to further provide such juris-
diction where "the employee habitually carries out his work").
189. See id. art. 17 (providing that consent to jurisdiction elsewhere cannot
deprive a court of its exclusive jurisdiction); Inter-American Convention, supra note
10, art. 1(A)(4) (providing that consent to jurisdiction is valid only "[i]n the case of
non-exclusive fora).
190. See supra note 81.
191. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
192. Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(3).
193. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
194. Cf KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 82 (recommending the listing as
an exorbitant basis for jurisdiction "the mere presence of a product manufactured
by the defendant which has caused damage, although he could not anticipate that
this product would be found on this particular territory"); Convention on the Law
Applicable to Products Liability, opened for signature Oct. 1, 1973, art. 7, reprinted
in 11 I.L.M. 1283 (providing that the law of the place of injury does not apply "if
the person claimed to be liable establishes that he could not reasonably have fore-
seen that the product or his own products of the same type would be made avail-
able in that State through commercial channels").
195. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 68 (citations omitted).
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question.... .196 Both jurisdictional requirements, "place of
performance" and "obligation in question" have presented diffi-
cult problems of interpretation.'97 U.S. courts have done no
better in defining the due process limits of jurisdiction for
breach of contract.'98 The Kessedjian Report suggests "a mini-
malist provision which would apply only to certain types of
contracts and would prefer an enforcement situs easily defined
in practice [such as] the effective delivery locus of the thing or
the property [or] the place of performance of the service."'99
Perhaps, in light of the difficulties experienced with contract
long-arm provisions in both the EU and the United States, this
is the best that can be done. It is regrettable that because of
the ease of modern travel and communication we cannot sim-
ply provide that commercial buyers and sellers who deal with
one another can bring suit in their home forums in disputes
arising out of the sale. If the objection to permitting either
party to sue at home is that "[i]t makes too much room for
concurrent jurisdiction,"' °° contracting parties have a simple
remedy for parallel litigation-include a choice-of-forum clause
in their contract.' °'
196. Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(1).
197. See Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United
States and the European* Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J.
COMP. L. 121, 140-41 (1992) (discussing the interpretation of this language by the
European Court of Justice). Moreover, the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities has refrained from giving a uniform meaning to "place of performance,"
holding that this is determined under the substantive law chosen by the forum's
choice-of-law rules. Case 12/76, Industrie Tesseli Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG,
1976 E.C.R. 1473, 1486, [19971 1 C.M.L.R. 26, 53. The Court has imposed some
limits on the meaning of "place of performance." See Mainschiffahrts-
Genossenschaft eG (MSG) v. Les Gravi6res Rh~nanes SARL, (Case No. C-106/95)
[19971 CEC (CCH) 859, 879 (holding that an agreement between contracting par-
ties "on the place of performance which is designed not to determine the place
where the person liable is actually to perform the obligations incumbent upon him,
but solely to establish that the courts of a particular place have jurisdiction, is not
governed by art. 5(1) . . . but by art. 17 [dealing with forum selection], and is
valid only if the requirements set out therein are complied with").
198. See Hall's Specialties, Inc. v. Schupbach, 758 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1985)(stating the uncertainty in determining whether a merchant buyer can get jurisdic-
tion over its merchant seller in a breach of contract action).
199. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 70.
200. Id. (referring to jurisdiction in tort wherever the harm occurs).
201. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13, 20 (1972)
(enforcing a clause consenting to the exclusive jurisdiction of an English court).
See also Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 17 (permitting consent to exclu-
sive jurisdiction in a court of a contracting state).
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Courts at the situs of real and personal property should
have jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes over ownership of the
property."2 It would be a mistake, however, to deprive any
court with jurisdiction over the parties of the power to affect
the interests of those parties in property situated elsewhere.
The Brussels Convention restricts suits adjudicating "tenancies
of immovable property" to courts at the situs. °s If the pur-
pose of this provision for exclusive jurisdiction is to protect
residential tenantswho are likely to be in an inferior bargain-
ing position,"4 it is preferable to do so by special provisions
for consumer tenants that mirror the provisions for consumer
buyers of goods and services.0 5
E. The "Black List"
Whether the convention should have a "black list" of exor-
bitant jurisdiction depends upon whether the "white list" con-
tains the exclusive jurisdictional bases that may be used by
courts in signatory countries. If there is such an exclusive list,
the Kessedjian Report notes that a black list would be present
for "only pedagogical reasons."2 6 If, however, signatories are
free to utilize bases for jurisdiction not on the white list, al-
though other signatories need not recognize the resulting judg-
ments, a black list is essential to give U.S. defendants protec-
tion against the Brussels Convention black list2 " and to give
other signatories protection against U.S. bases for general
jurisdiction, such as presence and doing business, that are
202. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (stating that "when
claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between
the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the prop-
erty is located not to have jurisdiction"). An exception should be made for personal
property brought into the forum by force or fraud. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 82 (1971) (providing that "[a] state will not exercise judicial
jurisdiction, which has been obtained by fraud or unlawful force, over a defendant
or his property").
203. Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 16(1)(a). The Convention contains
an exception for "tenancies of immovable property concluded for temporary private
use for a maximum period of six consecutive months." Id. art. 16(1)(b).
204. See Case 241/83, R6sler v. Rottwinkel, 1985 E.C.R. 99, 124 (holding that a
suit between German lessor and lessee had to be brought at the Italian situs and
giving this explanation).
205. See supra note 187.
206. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 78.
207. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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considered exorbitant abroad."' The United States should
seek to retain these jurisdictional bases when the relevant
events occurred in the United States and all parties are U.S.
citizens, and should expect other countries to recognize the re-
sulting judgments. How the United States arranges interstate
jurisdiction of state and federal courts is not a concern of other
signatories.
If a black list is included, the Kessedjian Report lists six
candidates as a summary of "the conclusions of the Working
Group and the Special Commission of June 1994:"29 presence
of property to obtain general jurisdiction over the owner;210
nationality, domicile, or habitual residence of the plaintiff;11
doing business as a basis for general jurisdiction;212 tag juris-
diction;21 and "unilateral choice of the court by the plaintiff
(for example, on an invoice), without any 'express consent' by
the defendant."214 This last item seems misplaced. It presents
a problem known in the United States as the "battle of the
forms"215 and is dealt with in section 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code1 ' and in Article 19 of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods.1 7 Whether or not one contracting party is bound by a
term proposed by the other should be left to the contract law
that is selected by the forum's choice-of-law rules.
The Kessedjian Report suggests as possible additions to
208. See supra notes 119-38 and accompanying text.
209. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 80.
210. Id.
211. Id. Although the KESSEDJIAN REPORT refers to "the nationality of one of
the parties," it is the plaintiffs nationality that has been an exorbitant basis for
jurisdiction. See Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 3 (referring to the French
Civil Code). The report of the Working Group confirms that it is plaintiffs nation-
ality that is the improper basis for jurisdiction over the defendant. See Working
Group Conclusions, supra note 2, at 261.
212. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 80.
213. Id. at 82.
214. Id.
215. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle
of the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1217-19 (1982)
(stating that when printed forms exchanged by buyer and seller contain different
terms, a dispute over whether one of the parties may withdraw before goods are
accepted or what terms govern after goods are accepted "is commonly called a
'battle of the forms'").
216. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1977).
217. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18 Annex I (1980).
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the black list:
- the mere presence of a product manufactured by the
defendant which has caused damage, although he could
not anticipate that this product would be found on this
particular territory;
- the rendering of a provisional or interim measure in
order to adjudicate on the merits;
- the enforcement or registration of a judgment in order to
adjudicate on additional or supplementary claims.218
The first item on this list might be utilized to state its con-
verse-that in product liability cases, a manufacturer is subject
to jurisdiction in any country where the product causes harm
and that the manufacturer could "anticipate" its product would
reach in the course of commercial distribution.
V. OTHER ISSUES FOR CONVENTION DRAFTERS
A. Punitive Damages and "Fabulous"219 Verdicts
As previously stated,22 convention negotiators are likely
to focus on U.S. punitive damages and large jury verdicts as a
possible topic for special treatment. The Kessedjian Report
states that "t]he difficulties associated with the enforcement of
judgments awarding punitive damages or damages regarded as
'excessive' preoccupied the two Special Commissions of June
1994 and June 1996. "221 The Report suggests provisions per-
mitting signatories to deny enforcement to the punitive portion
of a judgment, and to enforce only single damages if multiple
damages are awarded.2" Furthermore, the Report suggests
218. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 82.
219. This is the word used by Lord Denning to describe U.S. jury verdicts. See
Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 734 (Eng. C.A.
1982) (Denning, M.R.).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
221. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 106. See also Takeshi Kojima, Coop-
eration in International Procedural Conflicts: Prospects and Benefits, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 74 (1994) (stating that "[i]n order to obtain the cooperation
necessary to reach international agreement on this issue, the United States must
assure the numerical propriety of punitive damage awards"); Schlosser, supra note
120, at 46 (describing U.S. punitive, multiple, and excessive damages as "the issue
which is probably the most delicate" for the convention negotiators).
222. See KESSEDJIAN REPoRT, supra note 3, at 106. But see Adler, supra note
18, at 103 (stating that "[a] treaty that eliminated treble and punitive damages
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that the convention include a definition of "excessive" compen-
satory damages' and notes that "the Special Commission of
June 1996 also emphasised the value of contemplating inclu-
sion of a clause similar to the one proposed in Article 8A of the
draft bilateral treaty between the United Kingdom and the
United States,"" which read as follows:
Where the respondent establishes that the amount awarded
by the court of origin is greatly in excess of the amount, in-
cluding costs, that would have been awarded on the basis of
the findings of law and fact established in the court of origin,
had the assessment of that amount been a matter for the
court addressed that court may, to the extent then permitted
by the law generally applicable in that court to the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments, recognize and
enforce the judgment in a lesser amount.'
All of these provisions are undesirable. The problem of
punitive, multiple, and excessive damages can be dealt with
under a general public policy exception,"5 which any judg-
ments convention will undoubtedly include.2 7 There should
be no attempt to specify what falls within this exception, 228
whether it be punitive damages or a bizarre choice of law. 9
could be challenged on due process and equal protection grounds").
223. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 106.
224. Id. at 108.
225. See von Mehren, supra note 2, at 274 (quoting Article 8A added in 1978).
226. See Brand, supra note 84, at 174 (stating that German, Swiss, Japanese,
and U.S. cases dealing with requests to enforce foreign judgments and arbitration
awards "indicate that the international system has dealt adequately with punitive
awards in civil judgments through the traditional public policy exception to recog-
nition and enforcement"); cf Brand, supra note 39, at 295-96 (stating that "[tlo
face concerns about the size of United States jury awards, a treaty provision could
allow for discretionary refusal of recognition and enforcement based on public poli-
cy").
227. See Juenger, supra note 22, at 21 (stating that "[niot merely domestic law
but most recognition treaties and conventions recognize [a public policy] reserva-
tion"); Karen E. Minehan, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of For.
eign Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis?, 18 Loy. L.A. INTIL & COMP. L.J. 795, 796
(1996) (stating that "the public policy exception is necessary to ensure the eventual
adoption of a multilateral judgments convention because it allays the concerns of
states that are reluctant to join a multilateral convention without such a 'safety
valve'").
228. See Juenger, supra note 22, at 22-23 (stating that "[any attempt to enu-
merate the instances in which the public policy reservation can be legitimately
invoked would be futile").
229. See id. at 34 (stating that "if a foreign court's choice of law should be so
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There is no indication that courts abuse the public policy ex-
ception when asked to recognize foreign arbitration awards
and judgments."0 If omitting specific mention of excessive
judgments creates an impasse in treaty negotiations, then
language such as the following might be inserted in the provi-
sion permitting non-recognition of judgments that are contrary
to the public policy of the state in which recognition is sought:
"If the state in which recognition is sought objects on public
policy grounds to a judgment awarding punitive, multiple, or
excessive compensatory damages, that state shall nevertheless
recognize and enforce that judgment in an amount that is
compatible with public policy." "s
B. The Degree of Finality that Entitles A Judgment to
Recognition
The Convention should specify when a judgment is ripe for
recognition and enforcement. The Inter-American Judgments
Convention represents one extreme, stating that "[floreign
judgments shall not have extraterritorial validity unless, in
addition to being final and non-appealable, they are entitled to
recognition and execution throughout the territory of the State
Party in which they were rendered." 2 The Brussels Conven-
tion provides for recognition and enforcement of "any judgment
grossly erroneous or capricious as to amount to a miscarriage of justice, the public
policy reservation offers a sufficient remedy"); von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 78, at 1639 (stating that "the choice-of-law question should not generally be
open in recognition practice, but we would permit a court to deny recognition
when the foreign judgment rests on a highly unusual and arbitrary choice of law").
230. See Brand, supra note 84, at 174 (stating that "the international system
has dealt adequately with punitive awards in civil judgments through the tradi-
tional public policy exception to recognition and enforcement); Juenger, supra note
22, at 23 (stating that "courts do not employ [the public policy] safety valve in an
unduly expansive manner").
231. Lowenfeld, supra note 32, at 293 (stating that he "would be prepared to
agree expressly that punitive damages (properly defined) be excluded from interna-
tional recognition and enforcement, provided it was clearly stated that a judgment
awarding both punitive and compensatory damages could be upheld as to the
compensatory elements" and repeating this statement with regard to multiple
damages); Schlosser, supra note 120, at 48 (stating that "American negotiators ...
would be well advised to insist that American judgments awarding damages are
recognized and enforced to such degree as is compatible with the public policy of
the respective member state in which enforcement is sough).
232. Inter-American Convention, supra note 10, *art. 5.
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given by a court or tribunal of a Contracting State,"23 but
states that the enforcing court "may stay the proceedings" if an
appeal is pending.' I suggest that the enforcing state mirror
the circumstances in the rendering state. If the judgment is
subject to immediate enforcement where rendered, it should be
enforced elsewhere. If enforcement is stayed where rendered
either automatically on appeal or on posting of a bond, enforce-
ment should be suspended elsewhere. 5
C. Lis Pendens
Although not an issue of judgment recognition, the Con-
vention might have a provision governing a court's power to
take jurisdiction of the case if the same dispute is being adju-
dicated elsewhere. The Brussels Convention provides that "any
court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction
in favour of that court.""5 This solution has the disadvantag-
es of inviting a rush to bring suit before the possibility of set-
tlement has been explored 7 and also of requiring a defini-
tion of "first seised." 5
Another possibility is to follow the procedure in some U.S.
courts of allowing parallel international litigation to proceed
unless the forum's jurisdiction is threatened in the foreign
court, and to give appropriate res judicata effect to the first
judgment. 9 I suggest a flexible approach under which ordi-
233. Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 25.
234. Id. art. 30; cf. New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 27, art. VI
(stating that if a party has asked the proper authority to set aside or suspend an
arbitration award, the recognizing court may "adjourn the decision on the enforce-
ment ... and may also, on the application of the party claiming enforcement of
the award, order the other party to give suitable security").
235. But see von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 78, at 1657 (stating that
pending appeal in the rendering state, enforcement elsewhere "subject to appro-
priate safeguards, seems clearly proper").
236. Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 21.
237. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 86 (stating that giving prefer-
ence to the court first seised "is not satisfactory" because it encourages a rush to
file suit).
238. See Neste Chem. SA v. DK Line SA, [19941 3 All E.R. 180 (Eng. C.A.)
(holding that an English court is "seised" of a case within the meaning of Article
21 of the Brussels Convention when the writ is served and not when the court or-
ders service of process out of-the jurisdiction); KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3,
at 86 (stating that "differences among legal systems regarding the concept of
'seisin'... often give rise to difficulty in defining" this term).
239. See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1352-53 (6th Cir.
[Vol. XXIV:I206
HOW SUBSTANTIAL IS OUR NEED?
narily parallel litigation proceeds, but the courts are encour-
aged to communicate with one another to determine whether
one of them is clearly the more appropriate site for adjudica-
tion, and if so, that is where the suit will continue while the
other suit will be stayed or dismissed. 24 This procedure was
followed in an international bankruptcy case involving the
distressed enterprises of the late Robert Maxwell, in which the
Second Circuit deferred to an English court. 1 The last thing
that we want is a cumbersome proceeding, such as that of the
Conflict of Jurisdiction Model Act, 2 which emanated from
the American Bar Association Section of International Law
and Practice."4s Under the Act, parallel proceedings must al-
ways be avoided by a determination of the proper adjudicating
forum applying factors similar to those used in forum non con-
veniens determinations.2' Moreover, if an "adjudicating fo-
rum" has not been determined before judgment, forum courts
are directed not to recognize a foreign judgment unless the for-
eign court qualifies as the proper adjudicating forum."45 This
bar to recognition is likely to preclude recognition of the judg-
ments of any enacting state in countries that require a show-
ing of reciprocity as a condition precedent to recognition. 6
1992) (adopting the view of the Second and D.C. Circuits that a foreign suit
should not be enjoined unless necessary to protect the forum's jurisdiction or im-
portant public policies, but noting that in the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, duplication
of parties and issues is sufficient for an injunction).
240. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 86 (suggesting a "dialogue be-
tween the two or more courts addressed").
241. In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1054-55 (2d Cir. 1996).
242. See Louise Ellen Teitz, Taking Multiple Bites of the Apple: A Proposal to
Resolve Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Multiple Proceedings, 26 INTL LAW. 21, 56-62
(1992) (containing the text of the Act and drafters' comments). Connecticut has
enacted the statute. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-200 to -203 (West 1994).
See also Friedrich Y. Juenger, Judicial Control of Improper Forum Selection: Some
Random Remarks and a Comment on How Not To Do It, in INTERNATIONAL DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION 311, 322 (Jack L. Gold-
smith ed., 1997) (stating that "[aill in all, the ABA subcommittee's Model Act is
an undesirable piece of legislation").
243. See Houston Putnam Lowry & Peter W. Schroth, Survey of 1991 Develop-
ments in International Law in Connecticut, 66 CONN. B.J. 64, 74 (1992) (stating
that the Act was drafted by a subcommittee of this section).
244. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-202 (West 1994). See discussion of forum
non conveniens infra Part V.F.
245. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-201(a), (d) (West 1994).
246. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. See also Juenger, supra note
242, at 322 (stating that Connecticut courts will be compelled to give full faith
and credit to the judgment of a sister state that recognized a foreign judgment,
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D. Provisional and Protective Measures
Provisional and protective measures are often desirable to
"maintain the status quo" pending final judgment or "to secure
assets out of which an ultimate judgment may be satis-
fied."' 7 Some U.S. courts have issued protective orders in aid
of foreign litigation,"4 but others have refused."s Interim
orders granted by common-law courts are likely to be unfamil-
iar in civil law jurisdictions. 20  Nevertheless both the
Kessedjian Report and Professor Schlosser agree that the Con-
vention should set out jurisdictional rules for making orders
necessary to provide interim protection with regard to litiga-
tion abroad."
even if the foreign judgment does not meet the Act's standards).
247. COMM. ON INTL CIVIL & COM. LITIG., INT'L L. ASs'N (ILA), PRINCIPLES ON
PROVISIONAL AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 18 [herein-
after PRINCIPLES ON PROVISIONAL AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES], reprinted in
KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, Annex I. The Principles were endorsed by the
Executive Council of the ILA on November 16, 1996. See 36 I.L.M. 1052.
In England, the "Mareva" injunction is used to order a party not to transfer
assets in England or abroad. The injunction takes its name from Mareva
Compania Naviera S-.A v. Int'l Bulk Carriers S., [1980] 1 All E.R. 213 (Eng.
C.A. 1975), in which a shipowner sued a charterer for breach of contract and, in
an ex parte proceeding, enjoined the defendant from removing funds from a Lon-
don Bank. In Derby & Co. v. Weldon, [1989] 2 W.L.R. 412, 413 (Eng. CA 1988),
a Mareva injunction was used to freeze assets outside of England pending litiga-
tion outside of England.
Another example of an English provisional remedy is an "Anton Pillar"
order, which is issued ex parte to permit the applicant to enter the other party's
premises and inspect, remove, or make copies of documents. The order is named
for the case that established the practice, Anton Piller KG. v. Manufacturing
Processes Ltd., [1976] 1 All E.R. 779 (Eng. C.A. 1975).
248. See Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So.2d 996, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(affirming an injunction freezing husband's Florida bank accounts on request of
Guatemalan court).
249. See Pilkington Bros. P.L.C. v. AFG Indus. Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1039, 1047
(D. Del. 1984) (refusing to issue an injunction duplicative of an interim injunction
issued by an English court against a Delaware corporation).
250. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 74 (stating that some of the
principles stated in the PRINCIPLES ON PROVISIONAL AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES,
supra note 247, "may be unfamiliar to legal systems in the Roman law tradition");
Schlosser, supra note 120, at 46 (stating that civil law and common law countries
draw different distinctions between orders in rem and orders in personam and
that "[t]his difference also causes difficulties in regard to provisional measures
within the framework of the Brussels Convention").
251. See KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 74 (stating that "rules of juris-
diction concerning provisional and interim measures ... are essential"); Schlosser,
supra note 120, at 46 (stating that "the judge in the country addressed should
have discretionary powers on how to enforce a foreign interim order").
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The Principles on Provisional and Protective Measures in
International Litigation promulgated by the International Law
Association provide that "[t]he mere presence of assets within
a country should be a sufficient basis for the jurisdiction to
grant provisional and protective measures in respect of those
assets." 2 The Principles also provide protection for a defen-
dant whose assets are the subject of interim ordersY The
Kessedjian Report praises the Principles on Provisional and
Protective Measures as striking "a fair balance between the
respective interests of the plaintiff and the defendant" and
states that they are "very useful for the purposes of the Special
Commission" drafting the judgments convention.'
E. Recognition of Equitable Decrees
It may be that the convention negotiators will have all
they can handle drafting rules for recognition of money judg-
ments. Recognition of equitable decrees is a difficult topic be-
cause of the discretion involved in issuing the decrees 5 and
because of differences in remedies for violation. Even within
the United States with regard to full faith to judgments, the
Second Restatement of Conflicts takes the position that sister-
state equitable decrees must be "given the same res judicata
effect with respect to the persons, the subject matter of the
action and the issues involved that it has in the state of rendi-
tion," 5 but declines to make a "definite statement" with re-
gard to enforcement. 7 State courts have refused to enforce
anti-suit injunctions issued by sister statesY
252. PRINCIPLES ON PROVISIONAL AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES, supra note 247,
11.
253. Id. J1 6, 7 (assuring the defendant notice and opportunity to be heard);
8 (giving the court authority to require security before issuing an order); [ 13
(stating that "[t]he provisional and protective measure should be valid for a speci-
fied limited time" and subject to renewal).
254. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 74.
255. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102 cmt. c (1971).
256. Id. cmt. b.
257. Id. cmt. c.
258. See James v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 152 N.E.2d 858, 862 (11. 1958) (deny-
ing recognition of a Michigan decree enjoining administratrix from proceeding with
a wrongful death suit first filed in Illinois); cf. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118
S. Ct. 657, 667 (1998) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not
prevent a United States district court sitting in Missouri from compelling the
testimony of a former GM employee whom a Michigan state court had enjoined
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Despite these difficulties, the convention drafters should
seriously consider including judgments that order the perfor-
mance or non-performance of conduct other than payment of
money, at least to the extent of making such judgments res
judicata on issues decided," and not precluding full recogni-
tion and enforcement.260 There are hopeful signs that the
drafters will be amenable. The Working Group noted "a con-
sensus" that the convention should "not necessarily [be] limited
to money judgments,"26' and the Kessedjian Report states
that "[ilnjunctions ... should also be included, except those
relating only to the jurisdiction or seisin of a foreign court,
such as 'anti-suit injunctions."262
F. Forum Non Conveniens
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court may
decline to exercise its jurisdiction "if it is a seriously inconve-
nient forum for the trial of the action provided that a more
appropriate forum is available to the plaintiff."2" The doc-
trine is almost unknown in civil law jurisdictions' and is
not available under the Brussels Convention.2" Nevertheless,
from testifying in product liability litigation involving GM).
259. See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 56, § 481 cmt. b
(stating that "Uludgments granting injunctions ... are not generally entitled to
enforcement, but may be entitled to recognition").
260. See LOWENFELD, supra note 99, at 136 (stating that the convention should
"at least" include a provision making it clear that it does not preclude recognizing
injunctions).
261. Working Group Conclusions, supra note 2, at 259.
262. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 90.
263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 (1971).
264. See Fox v. Board of Supervisors, 576 So.2d 978 (La. 1991) (rejecting forum
non conveniens on the ground that it is a common-law doctrine and Louisiana is a
civil law jurisdiction). But see Case C-365/88, Kongress Agentur Hagen GmbH v.
Zeehaghe BV, 1990 E.C.R. 1-1845 (holding that in deciding whether to permit
impleader of a third party in an action on a warranty under Brussels Convention
Article 6(2), a national court may apply its own procedural rules to determine
whether the action is admissible); Schlosser, supra note 120, at 44 (describing
Kongress Agentur Hagen as accepting "a kind of reasoning which is very close to
forum non conveniens considerations").
265. See Case 42176, Wolf v. Harry Cox B.V., [19901 2 C.M.L.R. 43, 53 (1976)
(stating that "nobody is entitled to invoke the principles of common law on the
subject as a means of escaping the system laid down by the Convention, with
which all the Contracting States must comply"); Working Group Conclusions, supra
note 2, at 261 (stating that "[uinder Brussels/Lugano, there is, in principle, no
room for this practice"). But cf. In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd., [1992] Ch. 72
(Ch. App.) (holding that, despite the Brussels Convention, a forum non conveiens
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it is essential that U.S. courts be able to turn away forum-
shopping foreigners when they are injured abroad by products
made by U.S. manufacturers."' The Working Group noted
"that further study was needed" as to whether the convention
should permit a forum non conveniens dismissal."' The
Kessedjian Report seems hostile to the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, stating that all the reasons given for excluding it
from the Brussels Convention "are still current"26 and that,
if the doctrine is allowed, the convention would have to specify
the factors to be taken into account in ruling on a forum non
conveniens motion.6 9 This specificity is designed to allay the
civil law discomfort with judicial discretion on jurisdictional
matters.27 ° Trying to specify how a court should exercise its
discretion is like trying to fix a drop of mercury with a pin, but
if that is the price of getting forum non conveniens into the
convention,27' so be it. A good place to look for these specifics
is the primer that the Supreme Court of Florida wrote for the
guidance of lower Florida courts when Florida's highest court
stay was proper when the defendant was domiciled in England and the alternative
forum was in Argentina).
266. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981) (stating that a
foreign plaintiffs choice of a U.S. forum to sue a U.S. defendant "deserves less
deference" than is usually accorded to a plaintiffs choice of forum).
267. Working Group Conclusions, supra note 2, at 261.
268. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 44. See also Gerhard Walter &
Rikke Dalsgaard, The Civil Law Approach, in TRANSNATIONAL TORT LITIGATION,
supra note 82, at 41, 46 (stating that "[tihe rationale behind" the Brussels
Convention's exclusion of forum non conveniens "is that the typical interests of
both parties have been balanced in the statutory jurisdiction rules in general and
a priori" and therefore "there is no need to rebalance these interests in the partic-
ular case at the expense of legal certainty").
269. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 44.
270. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative
Declarations, and Related Tools of International Litigation, 91 Am. J. INT'L L. 314,
318 (1997) (stating that "the continental European countries generally reject forum
non conveniens, on the basis that it would introduce judicial discretion where dis-
cretion does not belong").
271. See also Schlosser, supra note 120, at 43 (stating that "the United States
could make a good bargain" by agreeing to "[glive up doing business as a basis of
general jurisdiction in exchange for being permitted to decline jurisdiction accord-
ing to forum non conveniens principles"). But see Peter Schlosser, Product Liabili-
ty, in TRANNATIONAL TORT LITIGATION, supra note 82, at 59, 80 (stating that "[ut
is understandable that the United States should try to avoid" attracting foreign
litigants seeking "huge amounts of damages," but that it is up to the U.S. "to
reconsider their substantive private international law rules to ensure that US
standards do not invariably apply to any tort litigation conducted in US courts").
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272broadened the scope of forum non conveniens.
G. Merger
The traditional U.S. rule has been that, unlike the case
with sister-state judgments, 273  a cause of action does not
merge with a foreign judgment in favor of the plaintiff.2 4 Al-
though the res judicata effects of the foreign judgment on fact
issues minimize the consequences of this non-merger rule,
27 5
one important practical consequence is that the plaintiff can
seek recalculation of damages hoping to recover a larger
amount.27 The non-merger rule for foreign judgments makes
little sense, and it is doubtful that it now represents the pre-
vailing U.S. view.1 7 The convention should give the non-
merger rule its quietus and provide that between the parties a
judgment shall be given the same preclusive effect that it had
in the country whose courts rendered the judgment, no more,
272. Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 674 So.2d 86, 94-96 (Fla. 1996).
273. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18(1) (1982) (stating that
after "a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff
[tihe plaintiff cannot... maintain an action on the original claim ... although
he may be able to maintain an action upon the judgment").
274. See Friedrich K. Juenger, An International Transaction in the American
Conflict of Laws, 7 FLA. J. INTL L. 383, 388 (1992) (stating that "foreign country
judgments do not merge the cause of action"); Reese, supra note 152, at 788 (stat-
ing that "[in contrast to the well-settled rule concerning judgments of American
origin, the prevailing view in this country is that the original cause of action is
not merged in a judgment or decree rendered in a foreign nation").
275. See Reese, supra note 152, at 788 (stating that "since the judgment will
normally be held conclusive of the issues involved, even though there is no techni-
cal merger, the question seems of no practical import").
276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 cmt. b (1982) (stating that if
it were not for the merger rule, "if the claim was unliquidated, the plaintiff might
[sue again on the original cause of action and] hope to recover a larger sum than
that awarded to him by the judgment").
277. See UNrFOIM1 ACT, supra note 42, § 3 (stating that a foreign judgment "is
conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a
sum of money [and] is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sis-
ter state which is entitled to full faith and credit"); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 56, §481 cmt. c (stating that "[a] foreign judgment is gener-
ally entitled to recognition by courts in the United States to the same extent as a
judgment of a court of one State in the courts of another State"); EUGENE F.
SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 957 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that "[tihe
non-merger rule has been subject to criticism and indeed makes little sense to-
day"). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 95 cmt. c, illus. 1
(rev. ed. 1989) (stating that "[no merger results, however, in the case of a judg-
ment for money damages rendered in a foreign nation").
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but surely no less." "No more" is important because some
foreign countries permit bringing separate suits for what a
U.S. court would regard as a single cause of action,279 and it
would not be fair or efficient to tell a plaintiff who had relied
on this permissiveness that the judgment abroad in its favor
bars it from pursuing here a claim still available there.
The Kessedjian Report recommends that the convention
not give res judicata effect to an unsuccessful jurisdictional
challenge.2 0 I disagree. It is proper, perhaps mandatory, that
the forum view the foreign judgment through the forum's juris-
dictional lens when the foreign jurisdictional rules are not the
same as the forum's.28' When different jurisdictional regimes
are operating, jurisdictional objections that the forum would
find cogent could not have been raised abroad. Under the con-
vention, all signatories will be applying the same white list
jurisdictional standards.282 If, in what should be a rare case,
a court believes that a foreign judgment flouts the convention'sjurisdictional standards, recognition and enforcement may be
denied under the public policy exception.2" It is unnecessary
278. Cf KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 94 (stating that "[i]t would be a
good thing if the Convention could take a position on these [res judicata] issues").
279. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 78, at 1604 (stating that "[m]any
countries . . . are prepared to allow the parties, if they desire, to fragment a
controversy that could be handled as a single matter").
280. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 98-100.
281. See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,
444 (3d Cir. 1971) (concluding that an English court's exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over a U.S. company "comports with our standards of due process"); UNIFORM
ACT, supra note 42, § 5(a)(2) (providing that a "foreign judgment shall not be
refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction if ... the defendant voluntari-
ly appeared in the proceedings, other than for the purpose . . . of contesting the
jurisdiction of the court over him").
282. See supra text accompanying note 105. This assumes that the U.S. propos-
al of a "gray list" of jurisdictional bases that other signatories may, but need not,
recognize is unsuccessful. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text. But cf. Brussels Conven-
tion, supra note 8, art. 28 (stating that "the test of public policy . . . may not be
applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction"). For the Brussels Convention, howev-
er, the Court of Justice of the European Communities sits as the final arbiter of
jurisdictional disputes and provides protection against a signatory's flouting of the
Convention's requirements. See Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of
Justice of the Convention, June 3, 1971, 1971 O.J. (L 304) 97, reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 1439, 1440 (as amended by accession of additional E.U. members), art. 1
(stating that "t]he Court of Justice of the European Communities shall have juris-
diction to give rulings on .. . interpretation"). The Court of Justice, however, can
respond only to interpretation requests submitted by a national court or by a
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and inefficient to require that in all cases the defendant be
permitted to renew a jurisdictional challenge that failed
abroad. No such second bite at the apple is permitted under
the Brussels Convention.2 '
Whether persons who were not parties to a prior judgment
may invoke its res judicata effects should, in most circumstanc-
es, be decided under the law of the state in which the judg-
ment was rendered. A defendant who claims that a suit is
barred by facts determined in a prior suit by the plaintiff
against another defendant, is invoking the doctrine of "defen-
sive collateral estoppel."' A plaintiff who claims that a de-
fense is barred by facts determined in a prior suit by another
plaintiff against the same defendant is invoking the doctrine of
"offensive collateral estoppel."25 Under the convention, a
judgment should be given the same nonmutual collateral estop-
pel effect in the recognizing state as in the rendering state.287
public official, not by a party. See id. art. 2 (listing the "courts [that] may request
the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on questions of interpretation").
See also id. art. 4 (listing the public officials who may request a ruling). For ex-
amples of the Court of Justice exercising this interpretation authority see supra
notes 145, 180-81 and accompanying text.
284. See Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 28 (stating that "[slubject to
the provisions of the first paragraph [providing exceptions for insurance, consumer
contracts, exclusive jurisdiction, and treaties between a signatory and non-signatory
excluding the exorbitant bases listed in Article 3] the jurisdiction of the court of
the State of origin may not be reviewed").
285. See Steven R. Harmon, Unsettling Settlements: Should Stipulated Reversals
Be Allowed to Trump Judgments' Collateral Estoppel Effects Under Neary?, 85
CAL. L. REV. 479, 486-87 (1997) (stating that "[diefensive collateral estoppel occurs
when a defendant attempts to preclude a plaintiff from litigating an issue that the
plaintiff has previously litigated unsuccessfully against another party"). The classic
example is Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal.
1942), in which the court precluded a plaintiff, who had unsuccessfully sought to
prove that a person had improperly withdrawn money from a bank, from suing
the bank for permitting the withdrawal.
286. See Patricia Anne Solomon, Are Mandatory Class Actions Unconstitutional?,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1627, 1641 n.58 (1997) (stating that a "free rider" prob-
lem exists if a party who has opted out of a class action can "if the judgment is
favorable [to plaintiffs] ... assert non mutual offensive collateral estoppel and
secure a judgment against the defendant without any effort, expense, or risk7).
287. See Burbank, supra note 39, at 1585 (stating that giving greater preclu-
sive effects to a foreign judgment than it has at home "would impose unwanted
costs on the foreign court system" because knowledgeable parties would litigate the
first case more intensively than they otherwise would); cf Marrese v. Am. Acade-
my of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding it a violation of full
faith and credit for a federal court to give a state court judgment more defensive
collateral estoppel effect than it would have in the state where rendered). But see
214
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A limited exception might be made for defensive estoppel in
which the second state can, as a matter of its own policy of
judicial efficiency, bar suit there but not preclude the plaintiff
from suing elsewhere.
H. Excluded Matters
The Kessedjian Report states that "the scope of the instru-
ment should be confined to civil and commercial matters, but
this concept must be clarified."s 8 The terms "civil and com-
mercial" are not defined in the Brussels Convention, but the
Court of Justice of the European Communities can assure a
uniform interpretation. s9 For other conventions using these
terms, the lack of a definition has resulted in disparate views
among signatories on the scope of the convention.29
What topics should be excluded from the convention? The
Kessedjian Report states that "it appears to be settled"29' that
"civil status and capacity of natural persons," "matrimonial
property regimes," "wills," "succession to the estates of de-
ceased persons," "bankruptcy and other similar procedures,"
"social security," and "arbitration" will be excluded either be-
cause they are covered by other conventions "or because they
raise particular problems and thus require a special regulatory
Andes v. Versant Corp., 878 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1989) (refusing to preclude
the plaintiff from suing defendants not joined in an English action even though he
would be precluded under English law); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 56, § 481 cmt. c (stating that "no rule prevents a court in the United
States from giving greater preclusive effect to a judgment of a foreign state than
would be given in the courts of that state"); Smit, supra note 60, at 63 (stating
that giving res judicata "deference [to the rules of a foreign country] is not only
illogical, but imposes on every person relying on a foreign judgment the often
difficult and expensive burden of proving the foreign law of res judicata). Perhaps
an answer to Professor Smit's objection is that the forum should presume that
foreign res judicata rules are the same as the forum's unless one of the parties
rebuts this presumption.
288. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
289. See supra note 283.
290. The 1965 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents, for instance, has no definition of "civil." See Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163. Signatories
have differed on the meaning of "civil." See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 56, § 471 cmt. f (stating that the U.S. and the United Kingdom regard
as "civil" all non-criminal proceedings, but that France also excludes "fiscal" mat-
ters, and Germany excludes "any matters involving enforcement of 'public law").
291. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 16.
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framework of their own."292 Also, because of the large number
of other bilateral conventions dealing with fiscal matters, cus-
toms duties, and fines, the Report suggests that these topics be
excluded. On the other hand, the Report suggests not ex-
cluding civil suits for environmental damage294 or suits be-
tween private parties "based on a breach of competition law or
acts of unfair competition."295
The Report's suggestions regarding excluded topics are
sensible and should not be a matter of controversy.
L Mass Torts
The Kessedjian Report has the following suggestions for
mass torts, apparently not the single-event mass tort involving
many victims of a disaster,296 but the temporally-and-geo-
graphically-dispersed mass tort in which many persons are
injured by the same cause, typically a defective product:
[Disputes involving a multiplicity of parties (often the vic-
tims), all of whom want to take proceedings in their own
courts, are much more problematic [than cases with one vic-
tim and one defendant]; the defendant being compelled to
defend his interests in many different jurisdictions. If the
Convention is also to cover these cases of multiple litigation
in cases of tort or quasi-tort, thought should be given to in-
cluding, perhaps, a clause providing for a different ground of
jurisdiction than the one chosen in cases where there is only
one claimant and one defendant.2
Although the Report does not state what this "different
292. Id. at 18.
293. Id. at 28.
294. Id. at 24.
295. Id. at 26. But cf Inter-American Convention, supra note 10, art. 6, which
excludes "torts" as well as "[plersonal status and capacity of natural persons;"
"[d]ivorce, annulment, and marital property;" "[cihild support and alimony;"
"[d]ecedents' estates (testate or intestate);" "[blankruptcy, insolvency proceedings,
composition with creditors, or other similar proceedings;" "[1liquidation of business
enterprises;" "[1]abor matters;" "[slocial security;" "[airbitration;" and "[miaritime
and aviation matters."
296. A classic example is In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), in which an explosion at Bhopal, India released poison
gas allegedly resulting in "deaths of over 2,000 persons and injuries of over
200,000." Id. at 197.
297. KESSEDJIAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 22.
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ground of jurisdiction" would be, the obvious solution would be
to compel all the victims to sue at the defendant's principal
place of business or place of incorporation. I disagree. A victim
injured by a defective product distributed in the victim's home
state through normal commercial channels should be able to
sue at home and not incur the added expense and inconve-
nience of suing abroad. Moreover, if the defendant is a U.S.
manufacturer, it would prefer that those injured by its prod-
ucts sue at home and not forum shop for a generous U.S. jury.
The typical tactic of a U.S. manufacturer in this situation is to
move for a forum non conveniens dismissal.298 U.S. manufac-
turers will oppose any convention that seeks to compel product
liability litigation in the manufacturer's country.
J. Conflicting Judgments
The convention should indicate which of two conflicting
foreign judgments are entitled to recognition and enforcement.
Countries differ as to whether the judgment that prevails is
the first or the last in timeY.2 9 The Brussels Convention se-
lects the "earlier judgment,""' and this seems a sensible way
to discourage post-judgment attempts by disappointed litigants
to get a better result in another forum. 0 '
The Brussels Convention does not define "earlier judg-
ment," but definition is desirable. I suggest that "earlier judg-
ment" be defined as the first judgment that is no longer subject
to modification at the trial level, although it may be subject to
appeal. Another possibility is to select the judgment resulting
from the suit first filed in order "to discourage multiple law-
suits between the same parties."3 2 This, however, would en-
298. See Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir. 1985) (dismissing
suit brought by 58 Costa Rican agricultural workers allegedly injured by
defendants' pesticides); Harrison v. Wyeth Lab. Div. of Am. Home Prod. Corp., 510
F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (dismissing suit by U.K. citizens allegedly injured by
defendant's oral contraceptive), affd, 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982).
299. See Juenger, supra note 22, at 25 (stating that u[tihe national reports
indicate the lack of a general agreement on [whether] the first or the last should
be honored"); cf Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) (establishing
a last-in-time rule for interstate full faith and credit purposes).
300. Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 27(5) (referring to "an earlier judg-
ment given in a non-contracting State").
301. See Juenger, supra note 22, at 25 (stating that "[tihe first-in-time rule
would seem preferable because it deters post-judgment forum shopping").
302. Id.
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courage a race to court and discourage pre-suit settlement
negotiations."0 3
The Brussels Convention departs from the first-in-time
rule to give absolute preference to home-court judgments."4
This parochialism should not be reflected in the new conven-
tion.305
VI. CONCLUSION
I have made the following suggestions to the U.S. negotia-
tors of the judgments convention:
1. Conduct a survey of current reception of U.S. judgments
abroad to determine how great is the U.S. need for the conven-
tion.306
2. Retain, for U.S. domestic purposes and for use against
defendants not domiciled in signatory countries, bases for ju-
risdiction likely to be black-listed, such as general jurisdiction
based on doing business and tag jurisdiction.307
3. Do not agree to a tort long-arm provision adopting the
"purposefully directed" requirement that got four votes in
Asahi. °5 The tort provision should subject a manufacturer to
suit wherever its product causes harm if the manufacturer
could foresee that the products would reach there in the ordi-
nary channels of commercial distribution.3 0
4. Any provision providing exclusive jurisdiction at the
situs of realty for in rem proceedings should permit courts
elsewhere with jurisdiction over the parties to affect the inter-
303. Cf supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text, discussing the "first seised"
rule of the Brussels Convention for avoiding duplicate litigation.
304. Brussels Convention, supra note 8, art. 27(3) (stating that a judgment
"shall not be recognized . . . if.. . irreconcilable with a judgment given in a
dispute between the same parties in the State in which recognition is sought").
305. See Juenger, supra note 22, at 26 (stating that "t]o prefer forum deter-
minations irrespective of when they were rendered, as some nations do, serves
neither comity nor judicial economy").
306. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 115, 137-38 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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ests of those parties in the realty and otherwise resolve dis-
putes between them related to the property."' 0
5. Resist any attempt to provide an exception specifically
covering punitive, multiple, or "excessive" damages. If this re-
sults in impasse, insert in the public policy exception language
such as the following: If the state in which recognition is
sought objects on public policy grounds to a judgment award-
ing punitive, multiple, or excessive compensatory damages,
that state shall nevertheless recognize and enforce that judg-
ment in an amount that is compatible with public policy.31'
6. Whether a judgment on appeal is entitled to enforce-
ment in the recognizing state should depend on whether it is
entitled to immediate enforcement where rendered.12
7. No provision should attempt to bar parallel litigation,
but courts should be encouraged to communicate and defer to
another court that is clearly the more appropriate site for adju-
dication.313
8. Provide that the presence of assets is sufficient for juris-
diction to issue provisional and protective orders concerning
those assets and provide protection for a defendant whose
assets are the subject of interim orders. 14
I
9. Decrees ordering conduct other than payment of money
should be recognized at least to the extent of making them res
judicata on issues decided, with discretion to accord the de-
crees full recognition and enforcement.3"5
10. Provide that a court with white list jurisdiction has
discretion to stay or dismiss the action for litigation in a more
appropriate forum.3 '
310. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
311. See discussion supra Part V.A.
312. See discussion supra Part V.B.
313. See discussion supra Part V.C.
314. See discussion supra Part V.D.
315. See discussion supra Part V.E.
316. See discussion supra Part V.F.
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11. Provide that a judgment has the same issue and claim
preclusion effect that it has where rendered, including an un-
successful attack on jurisdiction. Include a limited exception
for discretion to permit use of nonmutual defensive collateral
estoppel to bar suit in the forum but not preclude suit in other
signatories. 17
12. Oppose any attempt to limit jurisdiction for mass tort
claims to courts at the manufacturer's principal place of busi-
ness.
318
13. Adopt a first-in-time rule for conflicting judgments and
make no exceptions for judgments of the receiving state or for
judgments rejecting objections to jurisdiction. 19
Despite initial resistance,"'0 the Hague judgments project
is off and running. I suspect that, after much time and effort,
drafting will reach an impasse or that few countries will ratify
any convention that does emerge.3 ' The EU, with its Brus-
sels Convention, has little incentive to agree to recognize and
enforce U.S. judgments. I hope that I am wrong. In any event,
negotiating the convention will do us good by driving home to
us what aspects of our legal system appall some of our best
friends. This instruction may produce salutary changes in the
administration of justice in U.S. courts.
317. See discussion supra Part V.G.
318. See discussion supra Part V.I.
319. See discussion supra Part V.J.
320. See remarks of Mr. Philip, a delegate from Denmark, in I 17 H.C.P.I.L.
PRoc. 327 (1993) (stating that "there were profound problems associated with the
project and that it was too ambitious").
321. See LOWENFELD, supra note 99, at 129 (stating that "I have some doubt
whether the world is ready for such a convention").
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